作者/Author(s): Alex Vershinin 

網站來源/Source: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 

日期/Date: 03/18/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事


摘要：
傳統戰爭更加注重戰術和作戰層面，不適合消耗戰這種由一方補充損失和制定新戰略能力的打法。西方軍事理論偏好短兵相接的決戰，卻對消耗戰毫無準備。然而俄烏戰爭已經表明，在實力相近的軍隊之間，現代消耗戰極有可能發生，台海戰爭也可能是消耗戰。歸根結底，經濟生產力較高的國家，只要在打消耗戰時盡量避免出現重大損失，就更有可能贏得戰爭。 
經濟層面 
  • 工業部門在消耗戰中至關重要，其必須生產大量車輛、武器和彈藥。想要贏得消耗戰的經濟體必須要能夠大規模其軍隊和後勤部門。 
  • 工業部門也必須生產更多價格便宜的武器彈藥，零件也要能與民用產品交互使用，確保生產線不會隨便中斷。 
  • 對於發達的西方經濟體而言，要實現大規模生產極其困難，許多生產鏈在海外，而且也缺乏熟練的勞動力。 
  • 因此，西方經濟體想要打贏消耗戰，就必須改革經濟和軍事工業，隨時確保產能。
組建部隊 
  • 北約作戰理論主要培養承平時期接受過廣泛軍事教育並擁有豐富軍事經驗的軍官，他們能夠指揮前線作戰。
  • 蘇聯側重於快速大規模動員，創造一大批後備部隊，可以在消耗戰期間補充部隊，這些後備部隊會在戰爭中獲得經驗，提高其能力。 
  • 最有效的作法是結合北約和蘇聯模式，維持一支中等規模的職業軍隊，並有足夠的人選可供調動。經驗豐富的職業軍人可以穩定戰局或發起決定性攻擊，而經驗不足的預備役軍人則可以堅守前線，積累經驗，提高自身素質。 
  • 強大的部隊建立應該結合平民與具備戰鬥能力的士兵，以替換人員為優先做法，而不是一直創建新的部隊，也要將具經驗豐富的士兵分佈到新創建的部隊中。
Summary: 
The traditional war was more tactical and operational-centric, unsuitable for an attritional war decided by a side's ability to replace losses and generate new strategies. The Western military doctrine prefers short and decisive wars but is unprepared for attritional war. However, as the Russo-Ukraine War shows, attritional war is highly possible among forces of similar strength, especially during a war over Taiwan. Ultimately, the state with greater economic productivity and avoids sustaining heavy losses while exhausting its adversary's resources will be more likely to win an attritional war. 
The Economic Dimension 
  • Economies that can mass-mobilize their military through their industrial sectors will win attritional wars because they must produce many vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. 
  • They also must produce many inexpensive weapons and munitions with parts that are interchangeable with civilian goods, ensuring less disruption to the production line. 
  • It is difficult for developed Western economies to achieve mass production, especially when the production chains are overseas and they lack a skilled workforce.  
  • Therefore, Western economies must reform their economy and military industry to ensure peacetime excess capacity if they want to win attritional wars. 
Force Generation 
  • NATO doctrine focuses on training non-commissioned officers who have extensive peacetime military education and experience, allowing them to command the frontline when called upon for service. Although it gives higher flexibility in a dynamic battle, this doctrine is unsuitable for attritional war because it requires extensive training and experience. 
  • The Soviet doctrine focused on rapid mass mobilization, creating a large pool of reserve troops that could replenish forces during an attritional war. However, reservists would gain experience throughout the war, improving their capabilities. 
  • The most effective doctrine is a combination of the NATO and Soviet models that maintains a medium-sized professional army with enough candidates available for mobilization. More experienced reservists can stabilize combat or conduct decisive attacks, while the less experienced ones can hold the frontline and gain experience to improve their quality. 
  • A better force formation incorporates civilians with combat-capable soldiers, focuses on replacing lost men rather than creating new formations, and spreads experienced soldiers from previous wars to newly-created formations.
 
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