作者/Author(s): Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris 

網站來源/Source: War on the Rocks 

日期/Date: 02/12/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords：防禦、嚇阻 


摘要：
過去，中國缺乏強行統一台灣的能力，更傾向於和平解決兩岸問題，台灣也曾在台灣海峽上享有空中優勢。然而，台灣對中國的嚇阻力正在下降，台海爆發衝突的可能性與風險頻傳。因此，台灣必須消除嚇組力差距以保持其安全。因此，台灣必須縮小嚇阻差距，維護自身安全。 
  • 即使中國對美國在台海戰爭中的軍事干預持保留意見，但與台灣相比，中國的地區軍事力量十分強大，因此中國也做好了美國介入事態升級的準備。 
  • 中國保持克制的動力不斷減弱，自我控制的成本也持續增加。 
  1. 中國認為，美國已經開始逐步忽視作為中美關係基礎和維持台海現狀的 「一個中國」。 
  2. 一些專家認為，中國經濟早已達到頂峰並且正在放緩。因此，中國將發動一場轉移注意力的戰爭來解決其經濟問題。
  3. 由於美國持續壓制中國的科技行業，中國可能被迫入侵台灣以確保其對關鍵晶片製造設備，這種做法對中國來說可能成本較低。
  4. 中國的軍事實力可能也像其經濟一樣達到頂峰後走下坡。到2032年，美國將擁有現代化的軍事力量，這意味著中國強行重新統一台灣的機會和優勢會隨著時間減少。 
  • 台灣及其夥伴必須意識到嚇阻力可能隨著時間衰退，需要立即加強。
  1. ​​​​​​​台灣空軍應改變其空中攔截戰略，避免消耗飛行員和飛機的精力，專注於空中防禦任務。
  2. 台灣應優先採購和訓練精確射擊能，挑戰解放軍的防禦系統。 
  3. 台灣應重點採購、製造和部署地雷、無人機和飛彈，而不是昂貴的系統平台。 
  4. 台灣應增加對低地球軌道衛星網路的訪問，在危機期間力求保持通訊能力。 
  5. 台灣的區域合作夥伴需針對台灣海峽危機制定明確的應對策略。
  6. 台灣及其合作夥伴也必須鼓勵中國內部克制並維持現狀。
想要更深入閱讀，請參見：Jared M. McKinney和Peter Harris，《Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait》（賓夕凡尼亞：美國陸軍戰爭學院出版社，2024年）。可在以下網址找到：https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/964/。 
 
Summary: 
In the past, China lacked the capability to unify Taiwan forcefully and preferred a peaceful solution. Taiwan also used to enjoy air superiority over the Taiwan Strait over China. Yet, Taiwan's deterrence against China is deteriorating, and there is a risk that a conflict may break out soon. Therefore, Taiwan must close the deterrence gap to retain its security.
  • China's regional military power is enormous compared to Taiwan despite still having reservations about US military intervention in a war over Taiwan. China is also prepared to manage escalation even with the US's presence. 
  • China's incentives for restraining have been reduced, and the cost to China for exercising self-control has increased. ​​​​​​​
  1. China feels that the US is gradually ignoring "One China," which served as the basis for US-China relations and maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 
  2. Some experts argue that the Chinese economy has peaked and is slowing down. Therefore, China will launch a diversionary war to address its economic shortcomings. 
  3. Due to the US's strangulation of the Chinese technology sector, China may be compelled to invade Taiwan to secure its access to critical chipmaking equipment and facilities as it may be less costly. 
  4. China's military power may also be peaking, like its economy, and the US will have a modernized military by 2032. This means that China's window of opportunity and advantage to forcefully reunify Taiwan is shortening. 
  • Taiwan and its partners must realize deterrence can decay over time, and they must repair it immediately. 
  1. Taiwanese Air Force should change its air intercept doctrines to avoid wearing out its pilots and planes while focusing on air defense missions. 
  2. Taiwan should prioritize procuring and training precision fire capabilities to challenge PLA's defensive systems. 
  3. Taiwan should also focus on acquiring, manufacturing, and deploying mines, drones, and missiles instead of expensive platforms. 
  4. Taiwan should increase its access to low-earth orbit satellite networks to maintain its communication ability during a crisis. 
  5. Taiwan's regional partner should plan clear responses to a Taiwan Strait crisis. 
  6. Taiwan and its partners must also incentivize China to encourage internal restraint and preserve the status quo. 
For deeper reading, please see: Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris, Deterrence Gap: Avoiding War in the Taiwan Strait (Pennsylvania: US Army War College Press, 2024). Available at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/964/.  
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