作者/Author(s): Brian Petit
網站來源/Source: War on the Rocks
日期/Date: 02/01/2024
關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事
摘要：
作為一個小國，烏克蘭的作戰模式成功地拖垮了俄羅斯的軍隊，不少政策制定者和學者對這種模式很有興趣，並希望將其納入國防。然而，仔細觀察後會發現，烏克蘭模式的某些方面並非所有國家都可以學習。
- 俄羅斯異常的動員：普丁的入侵公告激發了許多烏克蘭公民戰鬥或逃跑。然而，澤倫斯基的移民限制和動員令則是最後一根稻草，他迫使所有年齡18至60歲的男性加入軍隊。來自俄羅斯的壓迫和國內的移民限制令，共同推動了烏克蘭大規模動員。一旦受到威脅，烏克蘭公民可能會在有機會時逃跑，將戰鬥留給武裝部隊。
- 新的國家法律和民兵管理：澤倫斯基實施了激進且高風險的社會防衛法，規定了所有軍警戰士和民兵的角色、責任和指揮系統。然而，這也允許私人和自由抵抗者進行暴力行動。烏克蘭的成功經驗很罕見，他們早在 2014 年就有了將軍警戰鬥人員和平民戰鬥人員結合，對抗俄羅斯的經驗。而且烏克蘭政府願意將作戰自主權分配給民兵。許多政府可能不願採取類似措施，因為他們不一定都經歷過全面入侵，也不願信任非正規戰士。
- 鐵路：烏克蘭利用其龐大的鐵路網進行防禦、疏散非戰鬥人員和提供補給。俄羅斯並沒有摧毀烏克蘭的鐵路網絡，因為它想反過來利用烏克蘭的鐵路進行自己的軍事行動。俄羅斯是在烏克蘭進行了有力抵抗，打擊其進攻計劃後，才開始將目標對準鐵路基礎設施。但烏克蘭的鐵路運營商也趁機改變了運營方式，以符合戰時需求。烏克蘭深入且廣泛的鐵路架構、鐵路員工的應變能力，以及俄羅斯的錯誤判斷，使烏克蘭能夠承受損失、適應環境並進行報復。
As a small power, Ukraine's model of resistance succeeded in bogging Russia's military down, driving policymakers and scholars to explore the model and incorporate it into national defense. Yet, on closer inspection, there are some aspects of Ukraine's model that not all countries can study.
- Mobilization anomaly: Putin's invasion announcement spurred a fight or flight response for all Ukrainian citizens. However, Zelensky's migration restriction and mobilization orders are the final straw that forces all capable men between 18 and 60 to fight. Taken together, Putin's psychological torment plus the inability to escape pushed the mass mobilization. Once threatened, citizens may flee when they can and leave the combat to the armed forces.
- National Resistance Laws and Militia Management: Zelensky implemented aggressive and risky societal defense laws to dictate the roles, responsibilities, and chain of command of all uniformed fighters and militias. However, it also allowed private and freelance resistors to operate and commit high-end violence. Ukraine's success is a rarity because they have the experience of combining uniformed and civilian combatants to fight Russia back in 2014, and the government is willing to distribute warfighting autonomy to militias. Governments may be reluctant to adopt similar measures because not all governments experience a full-scale invasion, nor are they willing to trust irregular fighters.
- Railways: Ukraine utilized its vast railway network to operate defense, evacuate non-combatants, and provide resupply. Russia did not attempt to destroy the Ukrainian rail network because it wanted to use it for its military operation. Russia only started to target railway infrastructure after Ukraine resisted well and foiled its plans, but the railway operator changed its operations to comply with wartime requirements. Ukraine's far-reaching railway network, the resilience of railway employees, and Russian miscalculations allowed Ukraine to absorb damages, adapt, and retaliate.