作者/Author(s): John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger 

網站來源/Source: Atlantic Council 

日期/Date: 06/15/2023 

關鍵字/Keywords: Deterrence 

摘要：

俄烏戰爭對美國、中國和歐洲提供了一些可能塑造未來台灣海峽衝突的教訓，這在美中日益惡化情境下特別有參考價值。本文探討了中國、美國和歐洲從這場戰爭中汲取的教訓、這些教訓如何影響行為體的戰略假設，最後提供一些政策建議。


中國 
  • 戰略假設： 
  1. 美國是一個正在衰落的霸主和對手，它透過煽動中國國內的不穩定，和鄰國之間的敵對情緒來遏制中國的崛起。 
  2. 俄羅斯是中國的戰略夥伴，一起面臨共存威脅。
  3. 歐盟可以制衡美國對中國的敵意，因此，穩定的中歐關係是必要的。然而，中國拒絕譴責俄羅斯的侵略行為或煽動性言論，偶爾會激怒歐洲社會。 
  • 教訓： ​​​​​​​
  1. 美國在烏克蘭衝突中花費的心力多寡，可能會影響美國對烏克蘭和台灣的武器生產和供應。 
  2. 大國間的軍事競爭、衝突以及核危機政策，是當前國際秩序的特徵。中國可能會做更充足的準備，以應對其與美國、美國盟友在亞洲的潛在軍事衝突。
  3. 美中之間加劇的敵意，讓中共更相信美國試圖推翻中共政權的說法。
  4. 雖然中國在俄烏衝突中，多以主權原則為其中心立場，但它更多地是為了維護中國對台灣的主權要求，使俄羅斯的行動合法化，而非實際嘗試在俄烏中間進行調解。 
美國 
  • 戰略假設 
  1. 繼續川普時代對中國的戰略競爭。
  2. 啟動對中國的遏制政策，同時為可能的軍事衝突做準備，以威懾中國。
  • ​​​​​​​教訓： 
  1. 雖然公開情報未能阻止俄羅斯侵略烏克蘭，但這仍是一個成功的行動。
  2. 中國人民解放軍與俄羅斯軍隊類似，都是「紙老虎」，因為他們沒有參與過重大衝突。除此之外，要執行兩棲登陸極其困難，而且美國的制裁是有效的。 
  3. 在衝突前和衝突期間，軍事支援、情報共享和保持溝通至關重要。 
  4. 美國必須承認，獨裁領導人會利用西方對核升級的自我約束。 
  5. 美國應該假設中國入侵台灣時會像俄羅斯一樣態度堅決。 
  6. 台灣傾向於法理台獨、獲得核武器或與美國建立半正式軍事聯盟等動作，皆可能會引發北京政府入侵台灣。 
 
Summary：
The Russo-Ukraine War gives the US, China, and Europe several lessons that may shape future Taiwan Strait conflict, especially given the increasingly bad blood between the US and China. This paper explores the lessons China, the US, and Europe have derived from the war and how the lessons shape the actors' strategic assumptions before providing policy recommendations. 

China 
  • Strategic Assumptions: ​​​​​​​
  1. The US is a declining hegemon and adversary that will contain China's rise by inciting instability within China and hostility among neighbors. 
  2. Russia is China's strategic partner that shares mutual coexistence threats. 
  3. The EU can counterweight perceived US hostility to China; therefore, stable China-EU ties are necessary. However, China had occasionally irked the European community by refusing to condemn Russian aggression or inflammatory comments. ​​​​​​​
  • Lessons: ​​​​​​​
  1. How deeply entrenched or distracted the US is in the Ukrainian conflict can affect US weapons production and provision to Ukraine and Taiwan. 
  2. Great power military competition or conflict and nuclear brinkmanship are characteristics of the current international order. China may prepare better for military conflict in Asia with the US and its partners. 
  3. Deepening enmity between the US and China reinforces Beijing's belief that the US aims to depose the CCP. 
  4. Although China's position on the Ukrainian conflict centers around sovereignty principles, it has more to do with asserting China's claim on Taiwan and legitimizing Russia's action than the actual mediation attempt. 
The US 
  • Strategic Assumptions: ​​​​​​​
  1. Continue the Trump-era strategic competition with China. 
  2. Activate containment policies on China while preparing for potential military conflict and deterring China. ​​​​​​​
  • Lessons: ​​​​​​​
  1. Public intelligence disclosure is a major success, although it failed to deter Russia's aggression or help Ukraine prepare. 
  2. The PLA is similar to the Russian military as a "paper tiger" because it has not engaged in major conflict, amphibious invasion is daunting, and sanctions are effective. 
  3. Military support, intelligence sharing, and maintaining communications are critical before and during the conflict. 
  4. The US must accept that authoritarian leaders will exploit the West's self-constraint on nuclear escalation. 
  5. The US should assume China would be as determined as Russia when invading Taiwan. 
  6. Taiwan's inclination for de jure independence, acquiring nuclear weapons, or forging a semi-formal military alliance with the US may trigger the Beijing government to invade Taiwan. 
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