作者：Yun Sun
來源：Foreign Affairs
日期：Jul 21, 2023

摘要：

在香格里拉對話期間，美國提出在南海和台灣海峽敵意日增的情況下，美中應舉行國防部長雙邊會晤之要求，然而中國拒絕了這個要求。

「拒絕」也是一種籌碼

  • 雖然美中可以透過對話的管道緩解緊張局勢，創造熱線危機緩和機制，但中國故意停止高層軍事對話，讓美國感到焦慮，迫使美國減少其在靠近中國的海空域之相關行動。
  • 雖然中國在其領土周邊表現出侵略傾向，但他們不想打仗。
  • 但是，若冒險一戰能約束美國在中國周邊地區行動時遵守中國的規則，使美國更難重啟軍事領導人之間的對話，那麼中國可能會奮力一搏。
  • 美國應該訂立明確預防衝突的紅線，並期待拜登和習近平的會面。

沉默是金

  • 北京深知軍事溝通管道可以紓解緊張局勢，預防衝突。
  • 然而，當中國想要推進自身利益時，它就會採取邊緣政策來獲取讓步或積累談判實力。
  • 鑑於美國在中國海空域的軍事存在感不斷提升，中國政府選擇保持沉默，不讓美國知道自己的底線，逼迫美國只能更加謹慎。
  • 中國願意與美國對話，但前提是美國撤出西太平洋。

碰觸底線?

  • 政策制定者都很震驚中國不願與美國軍方對話，因為這可能會導致意想不到的衝突。
  • 中國不會接聽中美危機溝通專用的熱線電話，因為中國認為接電話是示弱的表現，有違其邊緣政策的目的。
  • 與美國的不適相比，中國對當前的風險沾沾自喜。只有當衝突引發戰爭（如1962年的古巴飛彈危機）時，北京和華盛頓才能坐下來討論他們的共存條件。
  • 目前美國不能主宰談判條件，但美國可以對具體的目標表達關心，並達成建設性的理解。
  • 美國也必須了解，北京的耐心不會持續太久，特別是2024年臺灣將舉行總統大選。
  • 與此同時，美國必須接受中國有更高的風險容忍度之事實，但仍保持雙方之間一些次要的溝通渠道開放。雖然很難完全改變中國的行為，但可以為雙方建設性的軍方對話鋪路。只有美國撤出中國周邊，北京政府才會徹底退讓。
Summary:

During the Shangri-La Dialogue, China rejected US's request for bilateral meetings between their defense ministers amid the growing hostility in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.

Refusal as a Leverage

  • Although dialogue can alleviate tensions and create crisis de-escalation mechanisms, China deliberately suspends high-level military talks to make the US anxious and force the US to reduce its presence in sea and airspace near China.
  • Although China shows aggressive tendencies near its territories, it does not want a war.
  • Further, China may risk fighting if it can help to bind the US to follow China's rule when operating in its vicinity, making it harder for the US to restart dialogues between military leaders.
  • The US should clarify the redlines for conflict prevention and hope for the best during the Biden-Xi meeting later.

When Silence is a Virtue

  • Beijing understands that inter-military communications can reduce tensions and prevent conflicts.
  • However, when China wants to advance its interests, it will resort to brinkmanship to extract concessions or accumulate bargaining power.
  • In light of increased US military presence in China's sea and airspace, Beijing kept quiet to keep the US in the dark about its limits, making the US more careful.
  • China is willing to talk to the US, but only when the US withdraws its presence in the Western Pacific and talks less.

Reaching the Limit?

  • Policymakers are alarmed by China's reluctance to talk with the US military, which may lead to unintended conflicts.
  • China will not answer to US-China dedicated hotline for crisis communication because it feels that answering the phone is a sign of weakness and thwart the purpose of brinkmanship.
  • In contrast to the uncomfortable US, China is complacent with the current risks. Beijing and Washington may only sit down to discuss their terms of coexistence when a conflict will incite a war happens, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
  • Although the US currently cannot dictate terms for negotiation, it can highlight specific concerns and come to a constructive understanding.
  • The US also must understand Beijing's patience will not last forever, especially with the presidential election in Taiwan happening in 2024.
  • In the meantime, the US must accept China has higher risk tolerance, but some minor lines of communication are still open. Although it will not change Chinese behavior over midnight, both actors can pave the way to constructive military-to-military dialogues. Beijing will only back down completely once the US withdraws from its periphery.

 
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