作者/Author(s): James Timbie and Admiral James O. Ellis Jr. 

網站來源/Source: Texas National Security Review Vol. 5, Iss. 1, 83-93 

日期/Date: Winter 2021/2022 

關鍵字/Keywords: Defense Strategy, Porcupine Strategy 

摘要： 

無論是和平還是武力方式，習近平並未放棄統一台灣的目標。台灣可以利用其地理和技術優勢，並充分利用解放軍的弱點，以「數量眾多的小物品」來應對中國的入侵嘗試，例如更分散、更耐用、更便宜的防禦性武器，而不是投資昂貴的傳統武器裝備。 

不對稱防禦戰略（豪豬戰略） 

• 特點：使用小型、機動、低成本、耐用、分散和創新的防禦武器來對抗對手。
• 目標： 

1. 補充價值高且易受攻擊的常規系統。 
2. 警告台灣的對手，入侵的代價很高。
3. 有效的短程防空和反艦防禦和態勢感知可以使入侵的風險加大，增加失敗或受阻的機率。

• 豪豬戰略在台灣和美國獲得了相當大的迴響，但其執行速度緩慢且不盡人意： 

1. 雖然台灣領導層在其國防白皮書中強調了 「不對稱」一詞，但它主要由昂貴和脆弱的進攻性武器或遠程飛彈組成，對中國大陸造成的傷害也很小。這與專家預期的「數量眾多的小物品」相矛盾。 
2. 昂貴的進攻性傳統系統，如戰鬥機和艦船，在當前的灰色地帶衝突中有助於向中國表達抗議。
3. 發展本土國防產業可以增加政治效益並實現自給自足。 
4. 各個軍種有不同的自我偏好，他們更願意升級他們的庫存，而不是去採購未知的小型防禦性武器，這種習慣也影響了台灣目前的整體軍事採購。 
5. 政府缺乏可以將蔡英文的指導轉化為可行方案的軍事或國防專家。 

• 從現在開始台灣可以做的事情 :

1. 準確地推動「豪豬戰略」 ​​​​​​​
2. ​​​​​​​未來的國防預算需要包括大量採購分散且具有高機動性的系統，讓解放軍難以準確打擊。 
3. 增加對這些系統的培訓和支援，提高其作戰效能。 
4. 在美國及其盟國的幫助下，在本地生產一些短程防禦系統，或者從美國購買有效而便宜的先進系統。 
5. 推動長期的本土武器發展計劃，結合現有系統。 ​​​​​​​

• 繼續使用目前的常規系統，但為採購短程防禦系統分配更多的預算，並提供必要的培訓來操作這些設備。 
• 避免使用「不對稱」一詞，因為台灣政府可以將此詞適用於任何武器。應該是要著重於不對稱防禦的核心概念：「數量眾多的小物品」的組合。 
• 增加美國和台灣政府之間的合作，以評估潛在的中國威脅，制定對抗措施，並討論所需的必要系統。 
• 依據《台灣關係法》的規定與美國合作部署有效和有彈性的防禦系統。

1. ​​​​​​​告訴台灣如何及在何處部署這些系統。
2. 訓練相關人員以管理和使用這些系統。 
3. 按照「豪豬戰略」重新組織和培訓現役、預備役和民間防禦部隊。

• ​​​​​​​購置和建立抗網路攻擊的通訊網路和監視系統。 
• 增加能源、食品和彈藥的戰略儲備。 
• 增加電子戰防禦能力。 

• Characteristics: Using small, mobile, inexpensive, durable, dispersed, and innovative defensive armaments in large quantities against adversaries. 
• Aims:  ​​​​​​​

1. To supplement valuable and vulnerable conventional systems. 
2. To warn Taiwan’s adversaries about the high cost of invasion. 
3. Effective short-range anti-air and anti-ship defenses and situational awareness can make invasion riskier, increasing the probability of failure or obstruction. 

• Why is it suitable for Taiwan? ​​​​​​​

1. Taiwan’s geography is suitable for defense. 
2. Taiwan has the technical capacity to develop innovative weapons. 
3. The PLA needs to traverse across the Taiwan strait, exposing itself to anti-air and anti-ship defenses before reaching Taiwan’s shore. 
4. Amphibious invasion is complex and hard to execute, and US experts suggest that China currently cannot mount a full-scale attack on Taiwan. 

• The Porcupine Strategy gained considerable support in Taiwan and the US, but its execution is slow and unsatisfactory: ​​​​​​​

1. While Taiwan’s leadership stressed the term “asymmetrical” in its defense white paper, it consists mainly of expensive and vulnerable offensive weapons or long-range missiles that can inflict minimal damage on mainland China. It contradicts the “large numbers of small things” that experts anticipated. 
2. Expensive offensive legacy systems such as fighters and ships are helpful in the current gray-zone conflicts to signal defiance against China. 
3. Developing indigenous defense industries can add to political benefits and become self-sufficient. 
4. Various service branches have different preferences, preferring to upgrade their inventory instead of small defensive weapons, which guide Taiwan’s current overall military procurement. 
5. There is a lack of military or defense experts in the government that can turn Tsai’s guidance into a workable plan. 

• What can Taiwan do from here? 
• Advance the “Porcupine Strategy” accurately. ​​​​​​​

1. Future defense budgets need to include the procurement of abundant, dispersed, and mobile systems that are hard to target by the PLA. 
2. increase training and support for the systems to increase combat effectiveness. 
3. Produce some short-range defense locally with the help of the US and its allies, or purchase effective and inexpensive advanced systems from the US. 
4. Pursue a long-term indigenous weapons development plan with current systems. ​​​​​​​

• Continue current conventional systems but allocate more budget for procuring short-range defense and provide necessary training to operate the equipment. 
• Avoid the term “asymmetric” since the Taiwan government can apply the word to any weapons. Instead, focus on the core idea of asymmetric defense: a large number of small things. 
• Increase cooperation between the governments of the US and Taiwan to assess potential Chinese threats, formulate countermeasures, and discuss the necessary systems required. 
• Cooperate with the US in deploying effective and resilient defenses as the Taiwan Relation Act permitted. ​​​​​​​

1. Guide Taiwan on how and where to deploy the systems. 
2. Training personnel to manage and use the systems. 
3. Reorganize and train active, reserve, and civilian defense forces in compliance with the Porcupine Strategy. ​​​​​​​

• Acquire and establish cyber-attack-resistant communications networks and surveillance systems. 
• Increase strategic reserve of energy, food, and ammunition. 
• Increase electronic warfare defense capacity.