International Security: 然後呢？評估中國控制台灣的軍事影響

作者/Author(s): Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Caitlin Talmadge 

原文來源/Source: International Security Volume 47, No. 1 (Summer 2022): 7-45 

主題/Key Topics : Military Strategy

摘要:

有關台灣戰略重要性的文獻很多，但其潛在的軍事價值很少被討論。在這篇文章中，作者們展示了台灣的軍事價值，並比較了中國在菲律賓海於統一前後的海上封鎖（sea-denial）能力。具體而言，本文探討了中國水下作戰和海洋監視能力的變化，並不深入探討統一後的意圖、政治含義和軍事平衡。作者們得出的結論是，海上封鎖任務在統一後將極大地有利於中國，會破壞美國和其盟友的大戰略和安全。 
潛艇作戰 
 

  

之前 

兩岸統一後 

承平時期 

  • 美國可以沿琉球群島和呂宋海峽部署反潛戰（ASW）屏障，以探測試圖進入公海的中國潛艇。 

  • 美國有多種選擇來處理來自岸上反潛戰屏障的數據。 

  • 美國可以在菲律賓海域悄悄地追踪中國潛艇。 

  • 中國可以在台灣東海岸放置潛艇，這樣可以直接進入菲律賓海。 

  • 美國的反潛屏障將會無效或過時，追蹤中國潛艇將變得更加具有挑戰性。 

  • 中國重新補給和防衛其潛艇巡邏將變得更容易。因此，中國在菲律賓海增加巡邏並攻擊美國水面部隊的機會也會增加。 

作戰時期 

  • 美國水面部隊可以輕易地偵測和消滅中國潛艇，對中國造成高額損失。 

  • 對抗中國潛艇的反潛作戰很困難。 

  • 美國更容易受到中國潛艇攻擊威脅。 

 
中國潛艇作戰的未來 

  • 如果中國能在戰爭中及早消除美國的RAP障礙，那麼在台灣建立新的基地就沒有任何優勢。台灣的軍事價值將被降低。 
  • 如果解放軍的潛艇能在戰爭前突破美國及其盟國的反潛障礙，那麼台灣的軍事價值就無足輕重。 
  • 如果美國及其盟國能夠在戰爭期間迅速部署反潛屏障，或者在和平時期擴大反潛屏障的覆蓋範圍，即使台灣落入中國，美國及其盟國也會保持優勢。 
用於海上目標的海上監控 

  

之前 

兩岸統一後 

承平時期 

  • 中國的監察和偵察行動範圍和效率受到限制。 

  • 美國可以透過EMCON程序回避中國的SIGINT衛星；中國的成像衛星效能不佳。 

  • 中國可以部署DSC聲納陣列來監測菲律賓海，提高跨越式超視距雷達系統的範圍和效能。 

作戰時期 

  • 中國的監察資產容易遭受攻擊，而且會被優先摧毀。 

  • 美國將面臨可容忍的危險，但可以在不訴諸反衛星戰的情況下輕鬆擊敗中國。 

  • 美國的戰艦和潛艇很容易被偵測、分類和摧毀。 

  • 中國的DSC聲納中繼站很難破壞，因為它們可以深深嵌入大陸架中。 

  • 如果美國希望阻撓中國的遠程監控，他們可能會升級為反衛星攻擊。 
中國潛艇戰的未來 
  • 無論中國擁有多強大的監察能力，如果中國沒有足夠的技術能力和軍事結構來擊敗美國的水面部隊，長程攻擊將毫無意義，這會降低控制台灣的價值。
  • 如果中國能夠部署現代化成像衛星或提高美國反衛星作戰的成本，使得解放軍可以輕易地瞄準美國部隊，那麼台灣的價值將會降低。 
  • 如果中國能用SIGINT衛星覆蓋天空，美國的水面艦艇就需要長時間關閉雷達，變得容易受到空襲。無論誰控制台灣，美國都需要採取反衛星戰。 

如果中國控制了台灣，西太平洋潛艇戰的未來會有甚麼變化 

安靜的核動力攻擊潛艦和對海上運輸路線的威脅 

  • 第二島鏈上的DSC水聲傳感器可能無法偵測到安靜的潛艦。 

  • 中國潛艦不需要經過第一島鍊上的海峽，就能輕鬆進入菲律賓海的海上運輸路線，對菲律賓海形成更大的控制。 

安靜的核動力彈道潛艦和中美核平衡 

  • 中國在海上的核威懾更加持久，對美國大陸構成更高的威脅。

Summary: 
There was much literature on the strategic importance of Taiwan, but its potential military value was rarely discussed. In this article, the authors demonstrated the military value of Taiwan and compared China’s sea-denial capabilities in the Philippines Sea before and after reunification. Specifically, this article addresses the changes in China’s undersea warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities, and will not delve into the intention, political implication, and post-reunification military balance. The authors concluded that sea-denial missions greatly favor China post-reunification, undermining the US and its allies’ grand strategy and security. 

Submarine Warfare 

  

Before 

Post-Reunification 

Peacetime 

  • The US can deploy Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) barriers along Ryukyu Archipelago and Luzon Strait to detect Chinese submarines that try to reach the open ocean. 

  • The US has multiple choices to process data from the ASW barriers ashore. 

  • The US can trail Chinese submarines quietly in the Philippine Seas. 

  • China can place submarines along Taiwan’s eastern coast, allowing direct passage into the Philippines Sea. 

  • US’s ASW barriers will be ineffective or obsolete, and tracking Chinese submarines will be more challenging. 

  • China’s resupply and defense of its submarine patrols will be easier. Subsequently, increasing patrols in the Philippines Sea and attack opportunities on US surface forces. 

Wartime 

  • US surface forces can easily detect and eliminate Chinese submarines, inflicting high losses on China. 

  • ASW against Chinese submarines is difficult. 

  • US is more vulnerable to Chinese submarines attacks. 
The Future of Chinese Submarine Warfare 
  • If China could eliminate US RAP barriers early during the war, there would be no advantages of new bases in Taiwan. Taiwan’s military value would be reduced. 
  • Taiwan’s military value is insignificant if PLA submarines can break through US’s and its allies’ ASW barriers before a war. 
  • The US and its allies will retain an advantage if they can deploy ASW barriers rapidly during a war or extend the coverage of ASW barriers during peacetime, even if Taiwan falls to China. 
Ocean Surveillance for Maritime Targeting 

  

Before 

Post-Reunification 

Peacetime 

  • China’s scope and effectiveness of surveillance and reconnaissance operations are limited.  

  • The US can evade Chinese SIGINT satellites through EMCON procedures; Chinese imaging satellites cannot perform effectively. 

  • China can deploy DSC sonar arrays to monitor the Philippines Sea, improving the range and effectiveness of OTH systems. 

Wartime 

  • China’s surveillance assets are prone to kinetic attacks and will be destroyed first. 

  • The US will face tolerable dangers but can easily defeat China without resorting to anti-satellite warfare. 

  • US warships and submarines can be easily detected, classified, and destroyed. 

  • Chinese DSC hydrophones are hard to destroy since they can be embedded deep in the continental shelf. 

  • The US may escalate to anti-satellite attacks if they wish to obstruct China’s long-range surveillance. 
The Future of Chinese Submarine Warfare 
  • Long-range attacks will be fruitless regardless of China’s surveillance capabilities if China does not have the adequate technical capacity and military structure to defeat US surface forces, thus reducing the value of controlling Taiwan. 
  • Taiwan will be less valuable if China can deploy modern imaging satellites or increase the US’s cost of anti-satellite warfare such that the PLA can easily target US forces. 
  • If China can cover the sky with SIGINT satellites, US surface vessels will need to shut their radars off for a long time, becoming vulnerable to air strikes. The US needs to resort to anti-satellite warfare no matter who controls Taiwan. 
The Future of Submarine Warfare if China Controls Taiwan 

Quiet SSNs and Threat to the SLOC 

  • DSC hydrophones at the second island chain may not detect quiet submarines. 

  • Chinese submarines do not need to pass through RAPs at the first island chain and can easily access the Philippine Sea SLOC, gaining greater control of the Philippines Sea. 

Quiet SSBNs and the Sino-US Nuclear Balance 

  • China’s nuclear deterrence at sea is more durable and poses a higher threat to the US continent. 

List of Abbreviations 

DSC-Deep Sound Channel (Hydrophones) 

ASW-Anti-Submarine Warfare 

RAP-Reliable Acoustic Path 

SSN- Nuclear-Powered General-Purpose Attack Submarines 

SSBN- Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines 

OTH- Over the horizon radar 

SIGINT- Signal intelligence satellites 

SLOC- Sea Lines of Communications 

 
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