作者/Author(s): Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 2023/1月和2月 

關鍵字/Key Topics : Grand Strategy, Taiwan Invasion, US-China-Taiwan Relations 

摘要:

台灣入侵迫在眉睫？

• 專家們正確地判斷，中國確實有壓倒台灣的軍事能力，但專家學者們卻未能把握中國為何遲遲不發動入侵。然而，美國、中國大陸和台灣似乎認為時間對他們不利。
• 中國的觀點： 

1. 北京認為權力平衡有利於他們，兩岸關係正朝著正確的方向發展，和平統一仍然是雙方最好的選擇，只是北京也不排除使用武力。 
2. 然而，有一些北京官員認為美國正在利用台灣來破壞兩岸的和平發展。 
3. 台灣越來越多的反統一政治言論增加了北京的焦慮。 

• 台灣的觀點： 

1. 台灣承認解放軍實力的增強已經威脅到它的生存，尤其是北京的統一目標不是喊喊而已。
2. 台灣也擔心北京會用武力逼其屈服。 
3. 台灣同時也擔心美國必須分心處理全球其他區域的問題，並且在手忙腳亂的時候忽視了台灣。 

• 美國的誤解：

1. 雖然美國將注意力集中在俄烏危機上，但中國並沒有趁機攻打台灣。 
2.  習近平的統一目標日期與其說是一個明確的日期，不如說是一個願望。​​​​​​​

• 美國過於盲目地處理封鎖和入侵等戰術，反而無法直接應對眼前的威脅。 

1. 過度補償防禦將加劇緊張局勢，而不是阻止衝突。 
2. 美國忽略了更高層次的戰略問題，但這些問題才是真正的危險源。 

• 為甚麼入侵台灣的可能性很低? ​​​​​​​

1. 如果美國沒有把習近平逼近死胡同，台海衝突是可以避免的。 
2. 為了台灣問題與美國開戰，其實與習近平的中華民族偉大復興理念相衝突。 
3. 習近平不會冒險發動戰爭，這其實限制他的戰略彈性，也可能招致其他國家的強烈反對。 
4. 飽受戰爭蹂躪的台灣在政治、社會和經濟上對中國來說都是沒用的。 

• 習近平會將重點放在灰色地帶脅迫或經濟誘因上說服台灣進行談判，只有在沒有其他選擇的情況下，他才會選擇以武力入侵台灣。(相關行動將於第三部分持續討論) 

• Experts correctly judged that China does have the military capability to overwhelm Taiwan but failed to grasp why China has not launched an invasion yet. Yet, the U.S., China, and Taiwan seem to believe that time is working against them. 
• China's perspective: ​​​​​​​

1. Beijing believes that the balance of power favors it, cross-strait relation is moving in the correct direction, and peaceful reunification is still the best option but did not rule out the use of force.  
2. However, Beijing also contemplates the U.S. is using Taiwan to undermine it.  
3. Taiwan’s increasingly anti-unification political discourse adds to Beijing’s anxiety. ​​​​​​​

• Taiwan’s perspective: ​​​​​​​

1. Taiwan acknowledges the PLA’s increased strength threatens its survival, especially when Beijing’s reunification aim is real.  
2. Taiwan’s concern about Beijing choking it into submission is also genuine. 
3. Taiwan is worried that the U.S. is distracted with global issues elsewhere and ignored Taiwan in the process. ​​​​​​​

• The U.S. misinterpretation: 

1. Although the U.S. focused on the Ukrainian crisis in Europe, China did not take advantage to invade Taiwan. 
2. Xi’s target date for reunification was more of an aspiration than a definite one.  ​​​​​​​

• Obsession with blockade or invasion scenarios will blind the U.S. from dealing with immediate threats: ​​​​​​​

1. Overcompensating in defense will escalate tensions instead of deterring conflict. 
2. The U.S. will lose sight of broader strategic issues that are more dangerous. ​​​​​​​

• Why is the Taiwan invasion unlikely? ​​​​​​​

1. Conflict is avoidable if the U.S. does not push Xi into a dead end. 
2. A war with the U.S. over Taiwan contradicts Xi’s endeavor of rejuvenating China into a leading power.
3. Xi would not risk going to war and limiting his freedom of action or drawing backlash from other countries. 
4. A war-torn Taiwan is politically, socially, and economically futile for China. ​​​​​​​

• Xi will focus on grey-zone coercions or economic inducements to persuade Taiwan to negotiate and will only invade Taiwan if there are no other options.