RUSI: 俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭常規作戰的教訓(2022/02-2022/07)  


作者/Author(s): Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Dr. Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and N ick Reynolds 

原文來源/Source: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies 英國皇家國防安全聯合軍種研究所 

日期/Date: 11/30/2022 

主題/Key Topics : Military 


俄羅斯軍隊最初計劃在烏克蘭進行為期 10 天的戰役,這樣的話他們能夠在 2022 年 8 月之前吞併烏克蘭。俄羅斯計劃通過將烏克蘭軍隊從基輔調走並迅速佔領首都來執行這項行動。俄羅斯的快速行動讓他們取得了成功,但因為沒有做好後續的準備,俄羅斯軍隊並沒有有效運作。而烏克蘭軍隊的決心、西方的援助以及切斷俄羅斯後勤的能力給了俄軍致命一擊。這彰顯出了俄軍的無能,而且與大多數專家的預期結果完全相反。 


  • 聯合作戰中的等級制度以陸軍和特勤部門的指揮為優先,這讓其他部門的指揮鏈變弱了 
  • 有缺陷的作戰條令表明,在戰爭期間俄軍需要整合聯合軍種編隊,但他們沒有下級領導可以指揮和組合更小的部隊 
  • 俄羅斯軍隊,尤其是地面部隊和海軍,除非上級指揮部下令改變,否則他們將敗給多重錯誤 
  • 俄羅斯軍隊容易被欺騙,因為他們不能有效地整合訊息,並且在向上級報告時猶豫不決或不誠實
  • 俄羅斯軍隊很容易受到友軍的攻擊,因為電子系統無法充分識別敵友 

  • 生存能力取決於彈藥的有效分散、指揮結構、維護以及從安全地點指揮的能力,而不是現代武器 
  • 大量儲存彈藥和武器作為威懾並確保足夠的防禦,但這需要擴大武器工業基地才能夠有效儲存 
  • 無人和反無人機對軍隊的所有部門都至關重要。無人機對於監視和情報收集至關重要,而反無人機平台對於防禦至關重要 
  • 精確武器可以進行有效的作戰並減少對後勤的依賴,從而使部隊更俱生存能力。但是,使用精確武器必須有相應的計劃,以免被電子戰擊敗 
  • 隨著情報、監視、目標捕獲和偵察(ISTAR)的現代化,一般作戰單位很難不被發現。部隊需要充分分散以提高生存能力並快速移動以與敵人交戰或尋找掩蔽處。 
The Russian Army initially planned a 10-day campaign in Ukraine, which enabled them to annex Ukraine by August 2022. At the same time, Russian planned to execute the operation by drawing Ukrainian forces away from Kyiv and swiftly conquering the capital. However, Russia failed to operate effectively as they were unprepared, despite early successes. However, the determination of the Ukrainian army, assistance from the West, and the ability to cut Russian logistics dealt a killing blow to Russian forces. This shows Russian forces' incompetence, contrary to most experts' expectations. 

Reassessing the Russian army in the future 
  • The hierarchy in joint operations is prioritized in land forces and under the command of special services, undermining the use of other branches. 
  • The flawed operational doctrine suggests a consolidated combined arms formation during a war, but no junior leadership can command and combine the sub-units. 
  • The Russian army, especially the ground forces and navy, will succumb to multiple failures unless the higher command orders a change. 
  • The Russian army is culturally prone to deception because they cannot integrate information effectively and are hesitant or dishonest in reporting to their superiors. 
  • The Russian army is prone to friendly fire because the electronic warfare systems did not identify friends from foes adequately. 

Lessons for the West 
  • Survivability depends on the effective dispersal of ammunition, command structure, maintenance, and ability to command from a secure location, not modern weaponry. 
  • Stockpile ammunition and weapons massively as deterrence and to ensure adequate defense. The weapons industry base needs to be expanded to enable stockpiling. 
  • Unmanned and anti-unmanned aerial platforms are crucial for all branches of the army. Unmanned platforms are critical for surveillance and intelligence gathering, while anti-unmanned aerial platforms are pivotal for defense. 
  • Precision weapons allow effective warfighting and decrease reliance on logistics tails, making forces more survivable. However, using precision weapons must be planned accordingly to avoid being deterred by electronic warfare. 
  • With the modernization of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), it is hard to avoid detection. Forces need to be sufficiently dispersed to increase survivability and move quickly to engage the enemy or look for shelter.