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The Diplomat: 台灣對潛艦的渴望是很冒險的
 
 

作者/Author(s): Holmes Liao 

原文來源/Source: The Diplomat 

日期/Date: 09/10/2022 

主題/Key Topics: Defense, Asymmetric Warfare, Submarine Warfare 


摘要:
台灣的自製防禦潛艦(以下簡稱潛艦國造) 計劃耗資巨大，而且在戰略上無法有效應對解放軍的威脅。相反的，台灣應該優先發展反潛作戰 (ASW) 來對抗解放軍的船隻。

潛艦國造計畫的問題:
  • 該項目的承包商台灣國際造船股份有限公司(CSBC Corporation Taiwan)在建造防禦潛艦和系統工程方面缺乏經驗。 
  • 台灣無法在當地為其柴油潛艦生產特定的子系統，需要進口它們，這與美國維吉尼亞級核動力攻擊潛艦的成本相當。 
  • 台灣政府沒有進行「獨立驗證及確認」 (IV&V)，這會讓潛艦有可能產生技術風險。 
  • 中國懷疑潛艦國造計劃的成功也沒有停止對該計劃的外國援助。 

潛艦國造在戰略上是無效的： 
  • 對中國反介入/區域拒止戰略 (Anti-Access／Area Denial , A2／AD) 至關重要的解放軍海軍 (PLAN) 潛艦數量超過台灣和美國海軍的潛艦數量。 
  • 中國海軍的現代柴電潛艦（039C/D 型）安靜且對水面部隊構成嚴重威脅，增強了中國的水下反介入/區域拒止能力。 
  • 解放軍海軍擁有先進的反艦飛彈，可以輕鬆摧毀台灣的水面部隊。 
  • 解放軍的空中入侵涉及負責反潛作戰的運-8飛機。運-8 入侵可能是針對外國潛艦，但中國可能會在台灣周邊海域測試其反潛作戰能力。 
  • 解放軍的海陸空聯合力量在入侵期間會對台進行反潛作戰，使台灣潛艦面臨危險，無法進行有效的水下作戰。

台灣的反潛作戰能力： 
  • 中國海軍潛艦入侵台灣水下空間的可能性很大，但台灣國防部 (MND) 並未公開這一問題。 
  1. 國防部擔心丟臉，因為他們無法反制中國海軍的潛艦。
  2. 台灣沒有意識到水下威脅，因為他們沒有合適的水中聽音器來找出敵方潛艦。 
  • 台灣應該優先使用反潛裝置來發現和消滅解放軍潛艦。例如，水下聽音器（SOSUS 和 SURTASS LFA）、水雷和反潛飛彈。 
 
Summary:  
Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine (IDS) program is expensive and strategically ineffective against PLA’s threats. Instead, Taiwan should prioritize anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to counter PLA’s submarines. 

The Problems with the IDS Program: 
  • CSBC Corp, the program’s contractor, was inexperienced in building defense submarines and systems engineering. 
  • Taiwan cannot produce specific subsystems for its diesel submarines locally and needs to import them, matching the cost of a U.S. Virginia-class nuclear submarine. 
  • Taiwan’s government did not conduct independent verification and validation (IV&V), exposing the submarines to technological risks. 
  • China doubts the IDS program’s success and does not stop foreign assistance for the program. 

The IDS is strategically ineffective: 
  • PLA Navy’s (PLAN) submarines, which are crucial for China’s A2/AD strategy, outnumber Taiwan and U.S. Navy’s submarines. 
  • PLAN’s modern diesel-electric submarines (Type 039C/D), which are silent and pose serious threats to surface forces, enhance China’s underwater A2/AD ability. 
  • PLAN has sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles that can easily take down Taiwan’s surface forces. 
  • PLA’s air incursions involved Y-8 aircraft that are responsible for ASW warfare. The Y-8 intrusions were presumably directed at foreign submarines, but China may test its ASW ability in Taiwan’s sea space. 
  • PLA’s combination of air, sea, and underwater forces supports ASW against Taiwan during the invasion, exposing Taiwan’s submarines to dangers and incapable of conducting effective underwater warfare. 

Taiwan’s ASW capabilities: 
  • Although PLAN’s submarine incursions into Taiwan’s underwater space are highly possible, Taiwan’s defense ministry (MND) did not publicize this problem. 
  1. The MND fears losing face because they cannot subdue PLAN submarines. 
  2. Taiwan is unaware of underwater threats because they do not have suitable hydrophones to pinpoint hostile submarines. 
  • Taiwan should prioritize anti-submarine instruments to spot and eliminate PLAN submarines. E.g., underwater hydrophones (SOSUS and SURTASS LFA), underwater mines, and anti-submarine rockets. 
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