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Nikkei Asia: 習近平並沒有想要很快的在台灣問題上開戰 

作者/Author(s): Derek Grossman 

原文來源/Source: Nikkei Asia 日經亞洲評論 

日期/Date: 11/16/2022 

主題/Key Topics : Taiwan invasion 

摘要:

雖然人們越來越擔心中國會在 2024 年之前入侵台灣，但拜登駁斥了這些擔憂，並提出中國不會在G20 峰會後就馬上採取統一台灣的行動。拜登的觀點也得到了習近平本人的回應。儘管習近平在中共二十大期間指示 2027 將達到解放軍快速現代化的目的，但他目前仍堅定地主張和平解決台灣問題。 

退一步來講 

  • 習近平將兩岸關係惡化歸咎於外部勢力干預，他堅持認為，如果台北承認北京的「一個中國」原則，就會有政治談判的空間。雖然北京通過各種出版物和演講致力於統一台灣，但它沒有發出新的威脅。 
  • 北京對其目前的作戰能力沒有信心，所以在面對作戰或者衝突的選擇時將會更加小心謹慎，尤其是目睹了俄羅斯在俄烏危機的失敗之後。解放軍也意識到兩棲突擊的難度和實戰經驗不足。 
  • 北京反對西方增加對台灣的支持，而且也展現出了咄咄逼人的積極態度。這點導致澳洲、韓國、日本和菲律賓等國家對西太平洋局勢感到擔憂。但北京會想辦法避免同時與美國和其他國家發生軍事對抗。 

可能加速習近平時間的不確定因素 
  • 如果台灣現任副總統賴清德在 2024 年的總統選舉中接替蔡英文成為台灣總統，中國可能會認為是時候開戰了。
  • 中國持續衰弱的經濟可能會迫使習近平對台灣發動民族主義戰爭以分散國內人民的注意力。 
  • 入侵台灣仍然是習近平的最後手段，但在那之前他會先加強對台灣的經濟和外交脅迫、軍事壓力、網路攻擊和心理戰。 
 
Summary: 
Although there are growing concerns about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by 2024, Biden dismissed those concerns and suggested that China does not plan for a forced reunification of Taiwan anytime soon after the G20 Summit in Bali. Biden’s sentiment was echoed by Xi himself as well. Although Xi directed for rapid modernization of the PLA by 2027 during the 20th CCP Party Congress, he was steadfast in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.  

Taking a step back 
  • Xi blames external intervention for the deterioration of cross-strait relations and insists that if Taipei recognizes Beijing’s “one-China” principle, there will be room for political negotiation. While Beijing is committed to reunifying Taiwan through various publications and speeches, it refrained from issuing new threats.
  • Beijing was not confident in its current warfighting capability and opted to be more cautious, especially after watching Russia’s demise in Ukraine. PLA also realizes the difficulty of amphibious assault and their lack of combat experience.  
  • Beijing’s aggressiveness against increased Western support for Taiwan worries countries such as Australia, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. But it will seek to avoid a simultaneous military confrontation with the U.S. and other countries. 
 
The uncertainties that may accelerate Xi’s timeline 
  • If William Lai (賴清德), current Taiwan’s Vice President who is pro-Taiwan independence, succeeds Tsai as Taiwan’s President in the 2024 Presidential election, China may presume it is time for war. 
  • China’s underperforming economy may force Xi to wage a nationalistic war against Taiwan to distract the public. 
  • Taiwan’s invasion will remain the last resort for Xi, but he will intensify the use of economic and diplomatic coercion, military pressure, cyberattack, and psychological operations on Taiwan. 
 
 
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