作者/Author(s): Alexander Wooley 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 10/01/2022 

主題/Key Topics : A2/AD, Defense, Asymmetric Strategy, Naval Defense 

摘要:
烏軍擊毀俄製莫斯科號飛彈巡洋艦，震驚世界，尤其是軍事戰略家。烏克蘭的成功為台灣、中國和美國在 「反介入∕區域拒止」（Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD）能力方面上了一課。
 

莫斯科號的教訓 

• 艦艇極易受到反艦飛彈/攻船飛彈的攻擊。專家預計莫斯科號可以承受多達五次飛彈襲擊。然而，其他研究表明，一艘船可能會被兩枚飛彈摧毀或摧毀，莫斯科號就是這種情況。 
• 雖然艦艇可以防禦一兩枚飛彈，但它們無法防禦飛彈大餐。
• 如果船隻的反制措施失敗或船員不了解周圍的情況，就會很容易被摧毀。 
• 一艘受損的航空母艦之可操作性會大大受限。雖然不會致命，但卻會擾亂軍事行動的進展，因為航空母艦需要返回基地進行維修，而這相當於被擊沉。 
• 船舶在靠近海岸時更容易被發現和破壞，尤其是針對現代防禦系統。 

• A2/AD 是中國人民解放軍火箭部隊（PLARF）主要執行的任務，對於中國威懾美國在東亞的航母群至關重要。 
• A2/AD 的目標之一是通過一連串反艦彈道飛彈和巡弋飛彈壓制敵方船隻。 
• 在「擊殺鏈」模式中，狀況認知對於遠距離摧毀船隻至關重要。 
• 中國是否有這樣的能力，仍然值得商榷。

• 美國及其盟友必須利用軟硬防禦系統來對付解放軍的火箭部隊，特別是致命的極音速反艦導彈。 
• 美國改進了其反艦飛彈發射器和彈藥儲存，以便在戰場上停留更長時間。 
• 美國必須重新評估台灣目前的能力是否適合能夠有效威懾解放軍的「豪豬戰略」。 
• 目前部署在航母上的飛機不具備其前身機種的航程和酬載，這意味著它們需要靠近戰場。空中加油目前還無法實行，最快也要到2026年才可能具備此種能力。 

• 台灣仍有許多地對地飛彈可以打擊中國大陸作為報復，但這是不切實際的。 
• 烏克蘭的成功可能會改變人們對台灣剛愎自用的軍事領導人的看法，他們仍然偏愛主要的武器系統。
• 如果解放軍入侵台灣，美國和中國在空中和海上都沒有多少自由，進而使南海成為無人區。 

• Ships are highly vulnerable to anti-ship missiles. Experts expected the Moskva could withstand up to five missile attacks. However, other research indicated a vessel could be disabled or destroyed with two missiles, which is the case for Moskva. 
• While ships can defend themselves against one or two missiles, they can’t defend against a missile barrage. 
• Ships can be destroyed easily if their countermeasures fail or the crew is unaware of their surroundings. 
• A damaged aircraft carrier limits its operability. Although it is not fatal, it will disrupt the progress of the military operation since it needs to return to its base for repair, which is equivalent to being sunk. 
• Ships are more vulnerable to detection and destruction as they move closer to the shores, especially against modern defense systems. 

• A2/AD, which the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) primarily conducts, is crucial for China to deter US carrier groups in East Asia.  
• One of the aims of the PLARF’s A2/AD is to overpower hostile ships through a barrage of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles.
• Situational awareness is crucial in the “kill chain” model to destroy ships at a great distance. Whether China has the ability is still debatable. 

• The US and its allies must utilize hard- and soft- defenses against PLA’s rocket force, especially against deadly hypersonic anti-ship missiles. 
• The US improved its anti-missile launchers and ammunition storage to stay on the battlefield longer. 
• The US must reevaluate whether Taiwan’s current capability suits the “porcupine strategy” that can deter PLA effectively. 
• Current aircraft deployed on carriers do not have the range and payload of their predecessors, meaning they need to get close to the battlefield. Aerial refueling is currently unavailable and may only be possible starting from 2026. 

• Taiwan still has many surface-to-surface missiles that can strike China’s mainland as revenge, which is impractical. 
• Ukraine’s success may change the perception of Taiwan’s headstrong military leadership, which still preferred major weapon systems. 
• The US and China do not have much freedom in the air and sea if PLA invades Taiwan, making the South China Sea a no man’s land.