作者/Author(s): M. Taylor Fravel 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: September 15, 2023 

關鍵字/Keywords: Strategy, National Security 
 

摘要 

謂的「轉移注意力戰爭」系指當一國領袖密玲國內政經社會問題時,想要轉移國內問題注意力,鞏固其領導地位而有意挑起的衝突。一些學者和政策制定者預測,中國的國內困境和經濟增長緩慢將迫使中國參與轉移注意力戰爭。然而,中國領導人很少,或幾乎從未在國內問題激化的情況下貿然發起轉移注意力戰爭,因為中國比其他國家政府更能有效控制輿論和社會。如果中國領導人會為了內政問題而發起轉移注意力戰爭」的話,那麼東亞的處境將會更加危險。
 

為何不「轉移注意力戰爭」的原因 

  • 自1949年以來,中國面臨嚴重的民族、政治和經濟問題,但領導人從未發起轉移注意力戰爭以分散中國公眾的注意力。相反,中國領導人在國內重大動蕩期間,反而選擇了與外國行為者和解,展開合作 
  • 矛盾點在於中國的列寧主義制度,對中共國內影響深遠,並對人民進行嚴格的政府控制和公共輿論塑造 
  • 北京政府有選擇性地放寬那些不針對中國共產黨的抗議活動,以確認地方治理是否有問題。同時依靠複雜的社會監控網,在國內動亂失控之前就將其壓制下去。  
  • 中國的行為凸顯了發起轉移注意力戰爭的缺陷,即領導人發起對強大競爭對手或國家主義問題的衝突,而當地居民對此非常關注。但是,一旦領導人失敗,他們可能會引發政權崩潰。  
  • 例如,領導人很難找到低風險的目標來提高民眾的支持率;民眾會不以為然,因為他們期望政府能輕鬆擊敗他們。雖然收復台灣可能會提高當地的支持率,但島嶼衝突的代價高昂且結果非常不確定。 

 

 

預防內憂外患 

  • 雖然中國不太可能發起轉移注意力戰爭但國內動蕩可能會驅使中國出於其他原因使用武力 
  • 清朝時期,外國列強曾利用中國的內部弱點擴大影響或謀取利益,而現今的中國領導人力圖避免再次發生 「百年屈辱」。因此,中國領導人展示武力是為了表明決心,而不是為了轉移公眾視線或增強社會凝聚力 
  • 如果中國的經濟問題惡化,其領導人就會對外部威脅更加敏感,特別是在台灣問題上。在國外壓力和國內困難增加的情況下,中國領導人將更加好戰,以顯示其決心,這是一種威懾性質,而不是轉移視線戰術。 

 

Summary:

Diversionary wars are conflicts that state actors deliberately incite to divert local attention away from domestic problems and consolidate their leadership amid losing popular support. Some scholars and policymakers predicted China's domestic predicaments and slow economic growth would propel China to engage in diversionary war. Yet, Chinese leaders rarely or never start diversionary conflict despite domestic imbroglio because the state has greater control over public opinion and society than other governments. It is more dangerous when Chinese leaders feel fragile and insecure due to economic problems, causing them to lash out to show muscle and prevent other countries from taking advantage.  

 

Explaining the lack of diversionary war 

  • China had serious ethnic, political, and economic problems since 1949, but the leaders never initiated diversionary wars to distract the Chinese public, although the leaders have the incentives to start one. Instead, the leaders opted for conciliatory and cooperative behaviors with foreign actors during significant domestic unrest. 
  • The contradiction lies in China's Lenninist institution, which has profound domestic influence, strict government control over its population, and public opinion shaping.  
  • The Beijing government selectively allows protests not targeting the CCP to identify poor local governance. It also has a complex social surveillance network that silences domestic unrest before it gets out of hand.  
  • China's behavior shows a flaw in the logic of initiating a diversionary war, where leaders start a conflict against a strong rival or over a nationalist issue that locals are greatly concerned about. However, if the leaders fail their expeditions, they may bring down their government. 
  • It is hard to find low-risk targets to boost popular support; the public will be unimpressed as they expect the government to defeat them easily. Although subduing Taiwan may raise local support, a conflict over the island would be costly with uncertain outcomes.  

Preventing internal troubles, external aggression (內憂外患)​​​​

  1. Although China is unlikely to use diversion tactics, domestic unrest can drive China to use force for other reasons. 
  2. Chinese leaders sought to prevent another "century of humiliation," where foreign powers exploited internal weaknesses in China during the Qing dynasty to expand their influence or seek profit. Therefore, Chinese leaders show force to signal resolve, not distract public attention or increase social coherence. 
  3. If China's economic problem worsens, its leaders will be more sensitive to perceived external threats, especially regarding Taiwan. China will be more belligerent amid increased foreign pressure and domestic difficulties to show its resolve, which is more of a deterrent nature, not a diversion. 
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