BRI's Mystery ​​​​​​

• Beijing has domestic economic interests and global strategic ambitions for the BRI, thus willing to take risks to fund projects in politically vulnerable countries. 
• nstead of entangling borrowers in a debt trap to extort concessions, Chinese firms' lack of due diligence is most likely the cause of the debt crisis as the bids are intransparent and not assessed for their financial viability. 
• Contrary to popular claims, BRI's main threat to the Western world is not strategic but the debts that destabilize developing countries, which may cause problems for international financial institutions. Although the West has a Paris Club regime to handle issues on sovereign default and cooperation between creditors, China is not part of the group. Further, the obscure Chinese lending processes make it tough for international institutions to pinpoint a country's exact problems. 

• BRI debts are not the sole cause of the current debt crisis, as some distressed countries owe more to non-Chinese institutions. Yet, on close inspection, hidden BRI debts excluded from official debt statistics are one of the causes of the debt crisis. 
• Hidden debts are a problem because creditors do not know such obligations exist and thus cannot accurately assess credit risks. Further, when a debt crisis happens and creditors uncover the hidden debts, they will be reluctant to continue the debt restructuring process. 
• Although China has assisted in relieving the stress of debts, the obscure negotiation process complicates debt restructuring with other creditors, especially when comparability of treatment is critical. 
• The IMF has mechanisms and flexibility in restructuring hidden debts, especially when the lenders are Paris Club members. However, the IMF's current procedures are insufficient because it does not have enough bargaining power over China, and some of its frameworks are not working, given the leverage of China over debtor countries.