台海最嚴峻的威脅 (Part 2)

All three factors contributing to a major war of chance are present in current cross-strait relations. 
 

Recipe for Disaster 

• PLA air and naval forces have gradually increased their presence near the main island of Taiwan to erode the informal median line. The Chinese Coast Guard had also operated closer to Taiwan's offshore islands and even detained Taiwan-flagged vessels near Kinmen. 
• China will continue its military pressure campaign and will increase its intensity if Taiwan becomes accustomed and unresponsive to the coercions. 
• If a mishap does happen, political considerations for leaders from both sides make it difficult to find a way to back down. Neither leaders want to lose face or show weakness over the incident. Worse, it may fuel nationalist fervor on both sides, forcing them to remain steadfast and press their agendas more forcefully. 
• Taiwan had no official military allies, but US involvement could escalate the crisis. Furthermore, the US could not distinguish between Chinese actions as accidents, provocations, or a prelude to an invasion, and therefore may start to send its forces near Taiwan before fully understanding the actual situation.  
• Moreover, domestic political pressure, diplomatic commitment, and prestige could force the US president to deploy its forces rapidly or strike Beijing preemptively, causing the conflict to escalate further. 
• China's reckless military actions increase the likelihood of a war of chance. Unintended personal actions, poor airmanship, and arrogance may push Beijing into an unintentional escalatory spiral that it cannot escape. 

• To prevent a war of chance, China and Taiwan must reduce the chances for interactions that could be misinterpreted as hostile acts. It requires both sides to exercise restraint and warn their servicemen from showboating. 
• To avoid personal actions turning into full-blown conflict, China should closely monitor its activities and be aware of individual extreme actions to prevent conflict. China may also require information from the US officials about the behavior of its misbehaved servicemen and punish them when necessary. 
• China and Taiwan would need a certain level of communication to discuss crisis prevention and find an off-ramp that both sides can accept without losing face. Given the tense relations between the two central governments, the most effective way to convey the message is through backchannel mechanisms. 
• The US must recognize that its commitment to Taiwan's defense may brew a larger conflict. The US should maintain its "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan's defense and avoid explicitly declaring that it will come to Taiwan's assistance as it would force the US to intervene regardless of the situation.