作者/Author(s): Derek Grossman 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Policy 

日期/Date: 07/01/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 金磚國家、國際秩序、東南亞 


摘要：
2025年巴西金磚國家集團高峰會又有多名新成員加入，目前該集團合計全球 GDP (購買力平價，PPP) 的 40%，而 G7集團只有 30%。雖然金磚國家集團早在 16 年前就成立，但東南亞國家最近才開始嶄露頭角，印尼在今年初正式加入該集團，馬來西亞、泰國和越南則決定以夥伴成員身份參與，未來也不排除轉為正式成員。為何選在這個時間？ 
  • 金磚國家集團是一個非正式多邊架構，沒有明確的目標，只有約定每年舉行一次峰會。然而，這個機制如今正逐步成熟，地緣政治影響力日益提升，同時維持長期成長。當前金磚國家集團面臨的主要挑戰之一，是如何從「談話性平台」轉型為能實質產出政策並為會員國帶來效益的機制。
  • 新開發銀行（New Development Bank）與備用儲備安排（Contingent Reserve Arrangement）作為新成員的鼓勵措施，推動外國投資來源多元化，並確定危機期間的貨幣流動性。 
  • 從戰略層面來看，加入金磚國家集團讓成員國能夠參與互惠互利的多邊主義，並在激烈的美中戰略競爭中表達中立的立場。 
  • 今年的東協高峰會預定於10月舉行，可視為評估金磚國家與東南亞未來互動的試金石。東協輪值主席馬來西亞已邀請金磚國家領袖與會，但也面臨挑戰。 
  1. 部分東協成員國對金磚國家集團並不感興趣，也沒有參加任何相關機制。但中國作為金磚國家集團的核心，同時也是部分東盟國家的眼中釘。這些國家更傾向於限制中國在東協的影響力，而非進一步擴大槓桿空間。 
  2. 東協與金磚國家集團之間更緊密的合作有可能破壞 「東協中心性 」原則，反而削弱東協的戰略影響力。 
  3. 東協成員國可能會各自與金磚國家集團成員接觸，並專注於現有的倡議，如《區域全面經濟夥伴協定》（RCEP）。 
  4. 部分金磚國家集團成員亦希望維持中立立場，以避免激怒川普政府，反倒加劇全球貿易戰升溫。 
 
Summary: 
The 2025 BRICS summit in Brazil saw the inclusion of new members. The bloc now collectively has 40% of global GDP (PPP), compared to the G-7's 30%. Despite the BRICS being created 16 years ago, Southeast Asian countries only started to make a presence in this grouping recently, with Indonesia formally joining the coalition early this year and Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam deciding to participate as partner members, which could pave the way for full membership. Why now? 
  • BRICS was an informal multilateral arrangement without clear objectives apart from an agreement to meet once a year. However, BRICS is maturing, growing in geopolitical heft, and will stay. A concern for BRICS now is whether it can shift from a talk shop to a coalition that delivers actual policies and benefits for its members. 
  • The New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement serve as incentives for new members to diversify their foreign investment sources and maintain the liquidity of their currencies during crises. 
  • In strategic terms, joining BRICS enables members to engage in mutually beneficial multilateralism and signal their preference for neutrality amid the intense U.S.-China strategic rivalry. 
  • The ASEAN summit in October could serve as a benchmark for evaluating the future of BRICS and Southeast Asia. Malaysia, acting as the host, has invited BRICS leaders to the upcoming summit. However, challenges exist. 
  1. Some ASEAN members have no interest in joining BRICS or have any involvement with the group. China, a core member of BRICS, has been a thorn in the flesh for some ASEAN countries. These countries prefer to limit China's influence within ASEAN rather than expand its leverage. 
  2. Closer cooperation between ASEAN and BRICS risks undermining the "ASEAN centrality" principle and, thus, ASEAN's strategic influence. 
  3. ASEAN members are likely to engage with BRICS independently and focus on existing initiatives, such as the RCEP. 
  4. Some members wish to maintain a neutral stance to avoid provoking Trump and escalating the global tariff war. 
回上層