作者/Author(s): Vivek Chilukuri 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Policy 

日期/Date: 06/09/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 科技、美國、全球 


摘要：
川普政府可能會解除拜登時期對人工智慧擴散的限制，以贏得美中間的科技競爭。在美國AI技術優勢與全球需求的基礎上，部分解除禁令是一種科技國策，透過擴大美國產品，讓美國站穩全球科技競爭的頂端，藉此建立新的數位基礎建設戰略規範。 
  • 中國得力於特殊國家支持模式和西方沒有相關替代品，在5G 電信網路轉換的技術競賽中領先美國，華為與中興技術迅大多數新興市場快速普及。然而，美方對於如何贏得下一場競賽幾乎沒有共識。 
  • 科技對於政府的成長、治理與安全至關重要，因此，各國紛紛投入AI發展，包含相關硬體基礎建設、服務與技術人才培育。 
  • 由於科技轉型成本高昂、過程長久，且影響深遠，各國政府勢必在「與美國及其盟友合作」或「與中國合作」之間做出抉擇，因此，誰能搶先佈局，就能占據優勢。 
  • 與5G不同的是，美國及其盟國此次在AI供應鏈轉型上處於優勢地位，涵蓋全球雲端運算、低軌衛星與海底通訊電纜。然而，美國不應複製中國以國家主導的模式來推進AI競爭，也不應完全仰賴限制措施來阻止中國發展。 
  • 美國應調整外交政策，以因應全球科技競爭格局。 
  1. 美國應加強運用其戰略投資工具，例如川普時期設立的「美國國際開發金融公司（DFC）」與「美國進出口銀行（EXIM）」。但川普政府也應放寬某些金融限制，更新部分條件，以提升這些工具對外國政府與企業的吸引力。 
  2. 華盛頓也應加快技術商業外交，利用美國貿易發展署和美國商務服務局的技術專家支援對外合作。 
  3. 美國應與外國政府或公司建立技術合作夥伴關係。在滿足合作夥伴的需求並支援其融資需求的同時，確保這些夥伴願意遵循美國的政策要求，並在其能力範圍內配合執行。 
 
Summary: 
The Trump administration may lift the Biden era's AI diffusion restrictions to win the technological competition against China. Building upon the advantages and demands of U.S.-made AI technologies, the partial lift of the ban is a form of technology statecraft that puts the U.S. at the forefront through the proliferation of U.S. products and enables the U.S. to create new strategic digital infrastructure norms. 
  • The U.S. lost the technological race to China in the 5G telecommunication network transition due to China's state-backed model and lack of Western alternatives. This allowed Huawei and ZTE technologies to spread in nearly all emerging markets. However, there is little consensus in the U.S. on how to win the next race. 
  • Technology is necessary for governments to promote growth, governance, and security. Consequently, many governments are pursuing AI development and its related hard infrastructure, services, and skills.  
  • Since technological transition is costly, involves an extended period, and has generational consequences, governments will decide whether to meet their AI demands by partnering with the U.S. and its allies or China. Therefore, first-movers have the upper hand. 
  • Unlike 5G, the U.S. and its partners enter the technological transition from a position of strength and dominance in the AI supply chain, including global cloud, low-earth orbit satellites, and subsea telecommunication cables. However, the U.S. should not emulate China's state-backed approach in AI competition or depend entirely on restrictive measures. 
  • Instead, the U.S. could reform its foreign policy to adapt to the global technology competition. 
  • The U.S. should increase the use of its strategic investment instruments, such as the Trump-era DFC and EXIM bank. However, the Trump administration should loosen certain financial restrictions and update some requirements that limit the attractiveness of these financial instruments. 
  • Washington should hasten its commercial diplomacy for technology, using technology experts from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency and Foreign Commercial Services to support diplomatic operations. 
  • The U.S. should embrace technology partnerships with foreign governments or firms. While meeting the demands of its partners and supporting them with financing needs, the U.S. must ensure they adhere to U.S. requests and collaborate according to their capabilities. 
 
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