作者/Author(s): Gregory C. Allen 

網站來源/Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies 

日期/Date: 11/26/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 科技、出口管制、半導體


摘要：
此篇文章探討了美國出口管制對中國半導體設備產業的實際影響。 
  • 《中國製造2025》政策顯示，早在美國實施出口管制之前，中國就已開始推動半導體設備自給自足。
  • 美國出口管制的成效取決於全球市場、管制技術的複雜性、被制裁國家的技術能力，以及法案的制度設計。雖然美國出口管制確實讓中國半導體產業發展變慢，但中國最強的技術成就未遭限制，例如電動車和太陽能電池。 
  • 美國出口管制在某些方面阻礙了中國的半導體發展，但這只是短期的影響。同時，出口管制的確讓中國加速追求半導體本土化。 
  • 拜登的出口管制政策比川普版本更加全面，也更具影響力。拜登政府更與盟友合作，確保他們遵守相關限制。 
  • 過去 15 年來，中國對晶片製造設備的供需均有成長，但與其他頂尖供應商相比，中國的全球供應量微不足道，而且僅限於傳統節點。 
  • 中國半導體企業投入了大量資金進行研發，但2021年以後的成長趨緩，可能是因為缺乏外國專業技術支持。 
  • 即使在美國實施出口管制後，中國仍為全球頂級晶片設備製造商帶來可觀的收入。不過這些收入可能是管制前的訂單。 
  • 美國出口管制並未改變傳統與先進製程晶片的總體需求結構。中國仍是傳統晶片的首選供應商，而非受制裁國家則專注於先進製程晶片製造。中國也試圖透過現有技術創新來提升其先進晶片生產能力。 
  • 《外國直接產品規則》的漏洞與執行不力，讓中國不必直接對口美國，而是透過其他管道，獲得更多美國晶片製造設備。 
  • 無論美國及其盟友如何調整策略，中國半導體產業的去美國化或脫鉤趨勢都將持續下去。美國可以增加中國實現目標的難度，並從中獲取戰略利益。 
Summary: 
This article explores the actual impact of the US export controls on the Chinese semiconductor equipment industry. 
  • As indicated by the Made in China 2025 policy, China started pursuing semiconductor equipment self-sufficiency well before the beginning of US export control. 
  • The success of US export control depends on the global market, the complexity of the target technology, the technological capacity of the targeted country, and the act's institutional design. Although US export control did slow China's semiconductor industry, China's most significant technological achievements come from industries without export controls, such as electric vehicles and solar cells. 
  • The US export control hampered some aspects of the Chinese semiconductor sector, but it may have been only briefly. However, the export control did accelerate China's desire for semiconductor indigenization. 
  • Biden's export controls are more powerful and expansive than Trump's. The Biden administration also engaged with his close allies to ensure they comply with the restrictions. 
  • China's supply and demand for chipmaking equipment have increased over the past 15 years, but its global supply is minuscule compared to other leading providers and limited to legacy nodes. 
  • Chinese semiconductor firms spent large sums in R&D, but the growth has diminished since 2021, probably due to a lack of foreign expertise. 
  • Even after the export controls, China still contributes much to the revenue of top global chipmaking equipment firms. However, the revenues could be due to purchases predating the export restrictions. 
  • The US export controls did not change the composition of the overall demand for mature and advanced chips. China is still the preferred supplier for mature-node chips, while non-sanctioned countries focus on advanced node chipmaking. China has also attempted to enhance its advanced chip production by innovating with current technologies. 
  • The loopholes and lack of enforcement of the Foreign Direct Product Rule allowed China to obtain more US chipmaking equipment from non-US sources than directly from the US. 
  • China's semiconductor industry de-Americanization or decoupling will continue regardless of how the US or its allies tailor their approach. However, the US could make it more challenging for China to achieve its aims and extract strategic benefits from the technology competition with China. 
 
 
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