作者/Author(s): Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan 

網站來源/Source: Institute for the Study of War 

日期/Date: 10/30/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、台灣、烏克蘭 


摘要：
台灣可以從俄烏交戰過程中汲取寶貴的教訓，並為兩岸潛在的衝突做好準備。雖然兩岸交戰地形崎嶇，但台灣可以從俄烏經驗中再調整，以符合其需求。 

俄烏衝突如何定義現代戰爭？ 
  • 空中/飛彈戰爭： 
  1. 俄羅斯和烏克蘭利用綜合防空飛彈防禦系統 (IAMD) 來對抗複雜的飛彈和無人機攻擊，使雙方都無法取得決定性的戰果。
  2. 俄羅斯測試了各種飛彈和無人機組合，試圖偵測並穿透烏克蘭的防空系統。俄羅斯利用烏克蘭防禦系統的漏洞，進行壓倒性攻擊。
  3. 台灣可以重新評估其空防系統是否可以阻擋此類攻擊。然而，資源稀缺和技術複雜性可能會使台灣難以大量生產高端攔截器。因此，台灣可以學習烏克蘭，製造成本低、結構簡單的防禦系統，並訓練部隊使用簡單武器擊落無人機。 
  • 無人機戰 
  1. 烏克蘭和俄羅斯部署了數百萬台不同規格的無人機，負責執行特定任務。無人機改變了戰場，創造了幾乎透明的戰場環境，有效攻擊敵方。 
  2. 雖然無人機有其侷限性，但在摧毀裝甲車和減少己方傷亡方面非常有效。 
  3. 烏克蘭成為首個沒有海軍卻重創大國海軍的國家，摧毀了俄羅斯三分之一的黑海艦隊，迫使其撤退。烏克蘭透過無人機與反艦飛彈的戰略，搭配海上無人機巡邏黑海，禁止黑海艦隊靠近。
  • ​​​​​​​電子戰 
  1. 電子戰，通過干擾或屏蔽通訊信號，來阻止無人機或敵方的攻勢。 
  2. 電子戰中的攻防循環很快，在無人機開發者之間更是如此。烏克蘭和俄羅斯必須保護自己的通訊訊號，同時尋找對方系統中的漏洞，才能率先取得戰場優勢。 
  3. 然而，大部分無人機通常沒有特定標識，雙方都難以判斷範圍內的無人機是友軍還是敵軍。
對台灣的啟示： 
  • 烏克蘭和俄羅斯展示了戰術性偵察打擊綜合體（TRSC）可削弱成功的作戰層級操作。我們可以假設台灣和中國將修改TRSC以適應其需求和戰場環境。
  • 台灣可以先儲備中短程無人機來防禦海上攻擊，並加強其監視系統。 
  • 無人機可能無法擊沉敵對船艦，但可以混淆對手並削弱其防禦，給予台灣機會攻擊薄弱點，擾亂對方的進攻行動。 
  • 台灣應注意中國可能會採取類似措施，尤其是船艦是進行電子戰的重要平台。 
  • 台灣及其合作夥伴必須做好準備，才能在戰時快速與持續適應環境。有些系統可能在戰爭結束前就已經被淘汰。因此，能更快創新並執行彈性作戰的一方將佔據優勢。
Summary: 
Taiwan could derive valuable lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine and prepare against a possible clash with China. Although Taiwan will fight China in different terrains, it could adapt some lessons to suit its needs. 
How did the Russo-Ukraine War define modern warfare? 
  • Air/missile war: 
  1. Russia and Ukraine utilized integrated air/missile defense systems (IAMDs) to defend against complex missile and drone attacks, preventing both sides from achieving decisive results. 
  2. Russia tested different combinations of missile and drone attacks to monitor and penetrate Ukraine's air defenses. Russia overwhelmed Ukraine's defenses and exploited its vulnerabilities. 
  3. Taiwan could reconsider whether its air defenses could impede such attacks. However, resource scarcity and technological sophistication may complicate Taiwan's effort of mass-producing high-end interceptors. Therefore, Taiwan could learn from Ukraine, manufacturing cheap and less complex systems and train its forces to shoot down drones using simple weapons. 
  • Drone warfare: 
  1. Ukraine and Russia deployed millions of drones with different specifications for specific functions. The drones transformed the battlefield by creating a near-transparent environment and attacking enemies. 
  2. Although drones have limitations, they are more effective in destroying armored vehicles and reducing casualties on their side. 
  3. Ukraine became the first country without a navy to inflict a humiliating defeat on a great power after it decimated one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and forced it to withdraw. Ukraine succeeded by using a combination of drones and anti-ship missiles. Ukraine also used maritime drones to patrol the Black Sea, deterring the Black Sea Fleet from operating near its proximity. 
  • Electronic Warfare: 
  1. Electronic warfare, disrupting or blocking communication signals, could obstruct drones or stop the enemy's attacks. 
  2. The offense-defense in electronic warfare cycled quickly, especially among drone developers. Ukraine and Russia have to defend their communication signals and look for loopholes in the opponent's systems in order to have the battlefield advantage. 
  3. However, since drones are usually unmarked, neither side has a trusted system to know whether incoming drones are friendly or not. 
Implications for Taiwan:
  • Ukraine and Russia demonstrated an integrated Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (TRSC) could undermine successful operational-level maneuvers. We could assume that Taiwan and China will modify TRSC to suit their requirements and combat terrains.
  • Taiwan could start by storing drones with short and medium-range drones to defend against maritime attacks and supplement its surveillance systems. 
  • Although drones may not sink ships, they could confuse ships and overwhelm their defenses, giving Taiwan the opportunity to strike weak spots and disrupt attacks. 
  • Taiwan should note that China may deploy similar measures, especially when ships are excellent for electronic warfare platforms.  
  • Taiwan and its partners must prepare for rapid and continuous adaptation during attacks. Some systems may be obsolete before the war is over. Therefore, the side that could innovate faster and execute flexible operations will have the advantage. 
 
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