作者/Author(s): Erik Lin-Greenberg 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 10/08/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 大國競逐、衝突、戰爭 


摘要：
目前中東和亞洲各有幾個潛在軍事衝突熱點。頻發的挑釁事件可能會加劇雙方敵對情緒，但即使雙方行動越過紅線，也很少引發意外戰爭。邊緣政策的主要教訓是該國必須知道如何向敵人施壓，力圖在不引發戰爭的情況下改變對方國家的政策行為。而且，與對手的溝通至關重要，這樣雙方都能在行動中宣稱有取得成果，並減少彼此誤解的可能性。 
  • 國際關係學者數十年來針對意外戰爭的導火線爭論不休。他們的結論是，決策者有信心可以控制衝突升級，但偶然事件或軍事中的連鎖反應導致戰爭還是爆發了。冷戰期間雖然也發生過一些意外事件，但美國和蘇聯都了解衝突升級可能帶來的毀滅性後果，因此多次成功避戰。 
  • 國家行為者在危機中升級衝突，是為了表明決心，迫使對手改變行為。然而，挑釁行為非常危險，因為它們可能推升意外、誤解或誤判的風險，雙邊關係進入惡性循環。
  • 國際危機具有不可預測性，因為各國開戰的門檻或紅線都是機密。此外，國家行為者也會隱瞞自己的底線，以提升自身談判的籌碼與嚇阻力。
  • 另一方面，雙邊關係的不確定性可能導致衝突失控，引發危機。因此，領導人經常在邊緣與緩和政策之間小心試探，最大程度地達成目標，同時留給對手一些餘裕。例如： 
  1. 限制人員傷亡和對主要基礎設施的破壞。 
  2. 提前警告將採取行動，讓傷害降至最低。 
  3. 仔細設計攻擊的時間、地點和方式。 
  4. 避免直接挑戰對手的主權。 
  5. 使用隱秘且可脫責的手段進行鬥爭。 
  6. 宣佈結束衝突的意圖，重建嚇阻能力。
  • 控制危機的手對偶爾也會無效或失敗 
  1. 過度克制的回應可能無法改變對手的行為。 
  2. 決策者誤判對手的底線，變得比預期更具挑釁性。 
  • 雖然衝突已經爆發，但仍有機會趨緩，這個過程極具挑戰性。
  1. ​​​​​​​決策者面臨國內和國際壓力，必須展現決心。
  2. 新型通信技術讓國家行為體很難隱藏灰色地帶行動。這些技術也提供了更多樣的衝突手段，可能導致雙方衝突升級 
  3. 然而，近期伊朗-以色列衝突凸顯出戰爭是可以避免的，戰爭未必永遠符合國家利益。 
Summary: 
There are a few military conflict flashpoints across the Middle East and Asia in the present situation. Provocative incidents may escalate hostility, but accidental wars are uncommon even if redlines are crossed. The main lesson from brinkmanship is that states must know how to pressure enemies just enough to change their policy behaviors without triggering war. Further, communication with adversaries is crucial to allow both sides to claim success in their actions while reducing the potential for misinterpretation. 
  • International relations scholars debated the causes of accidental wars for decades. They concluded that policymakers were confident they could control conflict escalation, but war broke out due to chance or chain reactions in the military. Although there were some accidents during the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union refrained from war because they understood the devastating consequences of escalation. 
  • State actors escalate conflict during crises to force a behavioral change in an adversary and to signal resolve. However, provocations are dangerous because they may increase the risk of accidents, miscommunications, or misinterpretations that may lead to a downward spiral. 
  • Crises are unpredictable because the threshold or redlines that might trigger a war are not publicly known. Further, state actors conceal their limits to strengthen their leverage, allowing them to enhance deterrence.  
  • On the other hand, uncertainty may cause provocations to unravel out of control, leading to a crisis. Therefore, leaders often carefully thread between brinkmanship and de-escalation to advance their goals while giving their rivals the space to back down. Some instances are: 
  1. Limit the casualties and damages to major infrastructures. 
  2. Forewarn their actions to minimize harm. 
  3. Carefully design the timing, location, and method of attack. 
  4. Avoid actions that directly challenge the rival's sovereignty. 
  5. Use covert and deniable means to fight. 
  6. Declare conflict termination intents and reestablish deterrence. 
  • Occasionally, escalation control is ineffective or fails. 
  1. Over-restrained responses may not change an adversary's behavior. ​​​​​​​
  2. Policymakers misjudged the rival's redlines and became more provocative than intended. 
  • It is possible to de-escalate even if conflict breaks out, but it is challenging. 
  1. Policymakers face domestic and international pressures to show resolve. 
  2. New communication technologies make it harder to conceal gray-zone actions. Further, technologies also give a platform for provocative content that may escalate conflict. 
  3. Yet, the recent Iran-Israel conflict shows that war could be averted because a war is not always in a state's interest. 
 
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