作者/Author(s): Andriy Zagorodnyuk 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 09/23/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 防禦、安全、烏克蘭
 

當安全保證失效時 

  • 強國向弱國提供的安全保證，只有在強國實際在受保國境內部署軍力時才有效。換句話說，沒有實質軍事存在的「口頭承諾」與「書面保證」，對遏止未來的侵略行動毫無意義。 
  • 1994年《布達佩斯備忘錄》中，烏克蘭以放棄核武庫為代價，換取包括俄羅斯在內的多國提供安全保證。然而該協議簽署國皆未在基輔部署實質軍事資源，導致烏國數度被俄羅斯入侵。 
  • 直至2021年末，北約意識到俄羅斯企圖吞併整個烏克蘭的後，開始認真地提供烏克蘭軍援，拖延了俄軍的攻勢。
  • 在某些領域，烏克蘭實質上擊敗了敵人，例如在黑海及制空權方面。 
  1. ​​​​​​​儘管烏克蘭只有摧毀了部分俄國艦隊的力量，卻已使俄國艦船無法進入黑海，不得不撤往更東部的海域。
  2. 烏克蘭運用創新防禦手段削弱俄軍空中優勢，並突破攻勢打擊深藏於俄境內的戰略航空機群。雖然烏克蘭如今仍面臨飛彈與長程無人機的持續攻擊，但他們也成功迫使俄羅斯的載人戰機只能在遠離前線數十公里外的地區活動，同時還更加依賴無人平台支援地面作戰。
  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​雖然烏克蘭距離全面收復失土仍有一段距離，但他們有望能不陷入曠日持久消耗戰，同時達成一定程度的戰略癱瘓。烏軍可將重點放在癱瘓俄方的後勤、指揮協調、機動與火力支援等關鍵軍事功能，讓俄羅斯更難維持有效的戰場運作。 

When Security Guarantees Fail 
  • Stronger states have provided security guarantees to weaker countries, but these only work if the stronger states deploy an actual military presence in the accepting country. In other words, rhetorical security guarantees without physical presence are meaningless in stopping future hostilities. 
  • In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for a security guarantee from a consortium of several countries, including Russia. However, it did nothing to stop Russia from invading several times because the consortium did not deploy significant military resources to Kyiv. 
  • It was only in late 2021 that NATO became serious in arming Ukraine after realizing Russia's plan to annex the whole country, which stalled Russia. 
  • In some domains, Ukraine has functionally defeated its enemy, such as in the Black Sea and in air dominance.  
  1. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Although Ukraine had only devastated part of the Russian fleet, it had made its waters inaccessible for Russian ships and forced the fleet to withdraw further east. 
  2. Ukraine had used innovative defenses to blunt Russia's air superiority and innovative offenses to strike the strategic aviation fleet located deep within the Russian territory. Although Ukraine still faces constant missile and long-range drone strikes, it has forced Russian manned aircraft to operate kilometers away from the frontlines and rely more on uncrewed platforms to support ground forces. 
  • ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

    • Although Ukraine is still far off from liberating its territories from Russian occupation, it could achieve some degree of strategic neutralization without waging a decades-long war of attrition. Ukraine could focus on paralyzing essential military functions, such as logistics, coordination, mobility, and firepower, making it more difficult for Russia to conduct its operations 

     

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