作者/Author(s): Thomas J. Shattuck and Benjamin Lewis 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Policy Research Institute 

日期/Date: 10/09/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、台灣、中共 


摘要:
第四階段(2023 年 12 月至 2024 年 4 月): 選舉前後施壓 
  • 中國在2024年台灣總統大選前發動了小規模的氣球空中侵入行動,有些甚至飛越台灣本島上的軍事設施。 
  • 與此同時,解放軍減少在台海周邊的空中行動,避免被指控在選舉期間進行公開威嚇。然而,在選舉結束後,解放軍的活動明顯增加
  • 台灣國防部在報告中披露了更多資訊,包括飛機數量、飛行持續時間以及最接近台灣城市的距離 
 第五階段(2024年5月至今):賴清德時代的開端 
  • 自賴清德上台以來,解放軍持續對台施加壓力,在賴總統就任後立即進行了聯合作戰演習和執法行動 
  • 在台灣防空識別區的活動也有所增加,表明北京試圖常態化其在台灣周邊的軍事存在,並為可能的軍事入侵做準備 
結論與建議  
  • 台灣不斷釋出解放軍在其周邊地區軍事活動的軌跡,提升資訊透明度,增加外國對台灣的支持,同時積極促使鄰近國家釋出類似資訊。台灣繼續分享相關資訊,彰顯北京政府的實際威脅。 
  • 中國通過騷擾防空識別區的威嚇行動,成功達成目標,削弱了事實上的中線,並改變了台海現狀。儘管中國受到了國際社會的譴責,但各國並沒有採取實際行動阻止北京。 
  • 美國應向台灣提供新的雷達和防禦系統,提升其追蹤解放軍飛機和船艦的能力 
  • 國際社會可向台灣提供更多燃料和零件,減輕其國防預算壓力,提升台灣攔截能力 
  • 美國也應加強與印太地區緊密盟友的協調,有效嚇阻中國 
Summary: 
Phase Four (December 2023-April 2024): Pre- and Post-Election Pressure 
  • China launched a small-scale aerial incursion using balloons before the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Elections, and some even crossed military installations on the Taiwan island. 
  • At the same time, the PLA reduced air operations around Taiwan to prevent allegations of public intimidation before the elections. PLA's activity increased after the election ended. 
  • Taiwan's MND also disclosed more information in its ADIZ report, including the number of aircraft, duration of flights, and distance to the closest to Taiwan city. 
Phase Five (May 2024-Present): The Beginning of the Lai Ching-te Era 
  • The PLA has increased its pressure since the inauguration of Lai Ching-te, conducting a joint operations drill around China and law enforcement operations immediately after the inauguration. 
  • There has also been increased activity in Taiwan's ADIZ, indicating Beijing's intention to normalize military presence around the island and practice for a possible military invasion. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
  • Taiwan has increased the transparency of PLA's military activity around its region, increasing foreign support for Taiwan and prompting neighboring countries to release similar information. Taipei should continue to share as much information as possible to demonstrate the actual threat from the Beijing government. 
  • China achieved its objectives through ADIZ intimidation, diminished the de facto median line, and changed the Taiwan Strait status quo. Although China received backlash from the international community, they have not taken action to stop Beijing's actions. 
  • The US should provide Taiwan with new radar and defense systems to enhance its ability to track PLA aircraft and ships. 
  • The international community could provide Taiwan with more fuel and spare parts to reduce its budgetary constraints and enhance its ability to maintain its interceptors. 
  • The US should also increase coordination with its close allies in the Indo-Pacific region to deter China.