作者/Author(s): George Magnus 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 05/29/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 科技、經濟 



  • 習近平希望彌補中國在19世紀和20世紀初現代化失敗的遺憾。他的新經濟戰略雖然在資金問題上模糊不清,但很明確是要追求尖端技術生產領域領導地位。 
  • 習近平希望將中國推向科技進步的頂峰,引領全球政治經濟體系,促進國內增長和繁榮。然而,鑑於中國的專制治理、國家主義經濟政策和普遍腐敗,政府投資很可能會打水漂。 
  • 中國政府如果想要避免失敗並將資源分配給最具商業利潤的企業,就必須進行適當的會計工作。然而,中國政府大多數資金缺乏透明度,地方政府又沒有足夠的財力進行檢查,因此很難開展會計工作。 
  • 中國政府持續加大產業政策補貼的力度,以應對美國的出口管制和限制。然而中國同時還需要面對其他社會、經濟和安全問題,他們可能無法長期維持高額補貼。
  • 然而,最主要的問題是中國共產黨混淆了產業政策和創新的概念,前者側重於創造有利條件以培養領頭羊企業,後者則在鼓勵傳統部門的各個領域進行多元創新與發展。雖然中國在全球創新總指數中排名第12位,但在投入方面排名第25位,在產出方面排名第8位,這表明中國作為製造業大國有能力吸收知識技術,但缺乏培養創造力的制度因素。在專利註冊方面,雖然中國的專利數量占全球近一半,但其專利實用價值較低,且多在中國國內直接申請,這意味著這些專利不被其他國家認可或重視。 
  • 習近平以生產為中心的新產業政策未能解決危及中國經濟的系統性弱點,甚至會鼓勵生產過剩和需要較少勞動力的行業擴張。因此,無法逆轉從製造業和建築業向低薪、低技能行業轉移的趨勢。 
  • 雖然習近平對民營企業持積極態度,但北京政府仍持續限制民營公司政策,特別是在數據傳輸方面 
  • 習近平還將中共領導置於治理金字塔頂端,優先考慮國有企業,懲罰不同聲音,忽視促進國內消費的需要 
  • 新產業政策只會鼓勵以低價向貿易逆差大的國家出口更多商品,這已經引起了其他國家,甚至包括發展中國家的反感和報復
Xi attempts to reform the Chinese economy by pursuing a strategy central to technological innovation that enables Beijing to upend the current global economic order. However, this strategy will not work if Beijing clings to its inflexible economic policies or cannot address basic systemic weaknesses. 
  • Xi hopes to atone for China's failure to modernize in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Xi's new economic strategy is vague, especially on funding, but is clear in pursuing leadership in the production of frontier technologies.  
  • Xi hopes to put China at the pinnacle of technology and scientific progress which allows it to lead the global political economy systems and foster domestic growth and prosperity. However, given its autocratic governance, statist economic policies, and widespread corruption, government investments would most likely wasted. 
  • Proper audits are necessary to stop failing initiatives and allocate resources to the most commercially viable enterprises. However, it is difficult to conduct audits in China due to a lack of transparency in financing and local governments do not have the financial capacity to conduct inspections. 
  • In light of the US export controls and restrictions, China ramped up its industrial policy subsidies. However, as China needs to address other social, economic, and security problems, it will face challenges in maintaining a high level of subsidies. 
  • The main problem, however, is the CCP confused industrial policy with innovation. The former focuses on creating viable conditions to foster national champions and the latter seeks to encourage more development and creativity across different sectors, including traditional ones. Although China ranked twelfth in the overall Global Innovation Index, it placed 25th in terms of inputs, but 8th in outputs, signifying China's capacity as a manufacturing power to absorb and exploit knowledge and technology but lacking institutional factors to nurture creativity. Further, in terms of patent registration, although China accounts for nearly half of global patents, their patents are of lower-value utility and domestically filed, meaning they are not recognized or valued in other countries. 
  • Xi's new production-focused industrial policies fail to address systemic weakness that jeopardizes China's economy because it will encourage overproduction and expansion in industries that require less labor. Therefore, it won't reverse the trend of job transition from manufacturing and construction into lower-paid, lower-skill sectors. 
  • Although Xi has positive rhetoric toward private enterprises, the Beijing government maintains its policies that restrict private companies, especially regarding data transfer. 
  • Xi also put CCP leadership on top of the governance hierarchy, therefore, prioritizing state-owned companies, punishing those who dissented, and ignoring the need to boost domestic consumption. 
  • The new industrial policy only encourages higher exports at lower prices to countries with large trade deficits, which is already drawing backlash and retaliation from other countries, even among developing countries.