Normally it would suffice for Taiwan to pay only due attention to the domestic politics of the United States. However, after President Tsai Ing-wen tied Taiwan’s fate and security so closely to the U.S., we ought to sharpen our focus on what transpires there. It is believed that had Donald Trump been re-elected as President in 2020, the probability of conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have shot up. While enjoying the temporary reprieve now, it behooves us to remember that the key to Taiwan’s security is still hidden in faraway American politics. Why?

The decision on peace or war in the Strait is made not by Taiwan, but by the Chinese mainland, especially Xi Jinping. Unless the Mainland is willing to drag the status quo indefinitely into the future, three options are available to them: (1) to negotiate directly with Taiwan, (2) to resolve the Taiwan issue through the U.S., or (3) to solve it unilaterally.

The first option—namely, cross-strait negotiations—could be struck out off the bat. The deep hostilities of the governments toward each other and heightened sense of alienation among the peoples across the Strait seem to preclude this option. At present, Beijing seems to harbor no illusion about Taiwan, especially the Tsai administration. When the Kuomintang was in power, it held a position (“one China with respective interpretations”) and built a bridge (“1992 Consensus”). However, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) only holds fast to its position (“Taiwan is a sovereign country”) and has built no bridge across the Strait. Instead, President Tsai firmly believes that "China will surely turn around to accommodate the DPP position," hence no need to budge. She also irrevocably rejected Xi Jinping's proposal of January 2019 to “conduct extensive and in-depth democratic consultation on cross-Strait relations and the future of the nation.” Hence the first option is no longer possible.

With the outcry for “reunification by force” surging in the Mainland and the People’s Liberation Army’s growing impatience with Taiwan’s stranglehold on its entry to the first island chain, there is now mounting pressure for Beijing to leap straight to the third option.

Many American experts know that although the United States remains the world's sole superpower, it is increasingly vulnerable in East Asia. Should China launch a surprise attack on Taiwan, the U.S. military will not be able to rush to its rescue in time due to the tyranny of geography. And after China establishes a new "fait accompli" in Taiwan, it will be even more difficult for the U.S. to reverse the situation. This is why there has always been more wind than rain when U.S. chose to play the "Taiwan card,” and it always came to an abrupt end at critical moments.

Nevertheless, from Beijing’s perspective, it still prefers to force Taiwan’s hand without violence and not to engage the U.S. militarily. This would require the second option, i.e., talks with the U.S. China therefore must first get the talks started and then produce some results out of the talks. Either is conditioned by the domestic politics of the U.S.

It is clear that President Joe Biden prioritizes progress on domestic affairs over that of foreign policy since taking office. Pandemic relief and economic recovery easily took center stage, with wealth inequality, race, and partisanship being the oldest, biggest, and hardest nuts yet to crack. Currently, the Democratic Party enjoys a slim majority in both houses of Congress. Mr. Biden, who is moderate and tolerant in temperament, is perhaps the most likely leader to unite the country. And he has successfully brought the pandemic and economic situation under control. But there is still a long road ahead for the problems of race and wealth inequality. Worst still is the partisan politics.

In recent years, the Republican Party has increasingly leaned toward the right, and the Democratic Party toward the left, with the middle ground rapidly shrinking. Transnational polls show that the political polarization of the U.S. ranks first among the nine Western democracies surveyed (including Great Britain, Germany, Canada, and Australia, etc.). Other polls show that 50 percent of the Republicans and 40 percent of the Democrats see the opposite party with greater hostilities than those across racial and religious lines. One-third of Americans, including a majority of Republicans, believe that "the traditional American way of life is disappearing and are willing to use violence to save it." Even marriages, friendships, and workplaces in ordinary lives are affected by partisan politics. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult for the U.S. and China to sit down and reach an agreement.

But Beijing still decided to reach out first. Only three weeks after the U.S. election, Mainland China, through its former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu Ying, signaled its willingness in the New York Times to hold “equal and candid negotiations” with the U.S. Again, before the Chinese delegation departed from the Alaska meeting, it left the door open to continuing the talks in the future. Then, it waited patiently for Washington to iron out its China policy.

So far, the U.S. has settled its China policy only in principle: more "competition" than "confrontation," and more ”confrontation” than "cooperation." Notably, 90 percent of political appointees (including key positions regarding China and Taiwan, such as assistant secretaries in the Department of Defense and Department of State) and key policies on defense and trade have yet to be finalized.

If, by the mid-term election of the U.S at the end of next year, the U.S. and China still fail to get the talks started, or fail to reach an agreement on Taiwan, due to bitter domestic politics inside the U.S. Worse, if the Democratic Party loses its majority in Congress by the end of next year, and President Biden is to become a lame-duck and the inter-Party, even intra-Party fighting for the White House will resume once more, and prospects for U.S.-China dialogue appear dimmer still. Worst, if it seems likely the U.S. electoral process will crank out “Trump II” in 2024 who will join with “Tsai Ing-wen II” of Taiwan to keep Xi on strategic defensive for another four years.

Any one of the above three "ifs" might cause Beijing to conclude that it has exhausted its goodwill options and that “short-term pain is better than long-term pain.” Then the third option of unilateral resolution might be activated.

American politics will thus determine the security of Taiwan. How can we afford to look away?