SU Chi
          Stimson Center/TSE (Tsing-Hua Univ) Seminar
September 15, 2023

1. Taiwan: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs, for two decades

1. As detailed in my book, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China (1988-2008): A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (New York: Routledge, 2009), Taiwan, a much smaller power than either the U.S or China, had taken a number of initiatives, oftentimes without prior consultation with either or both powers, forcing Washington and Beijing to react, sometimes positively, other times negatively – definitely a rarity in international relations. Concrete examples include: “unofficially official cross-strait talks,” “one China, different interpretations,” “Cornell visit,” “announcement on special state-to-state relationship,” “92 consensus,” “one country on each side,” “new name (for the country),” “new Constitution,” “applying for UN membership,” etc.
2. A Tolerant U.S.   

1. Supporting Taiwan’s democratization, including tolerating the rowdy nature of its politics.
2. hoping Taiwan’s democratization would influence China’s political opening internally, and possibly liberalization, even democratization in the long term.
3. hoping Taiwan’s economic growth model would help softening China’s international behavior through enhancing its integration with world economy

3. A Restrained China --

1. Reconnecting with Taiwan (both the government and people) at long last, furthering the goal of reunification.
2. Learning from Taiwan’s successful economic growth model and attracting much needed capital therefrom.

2. Taiwan: A Bone of Contention, Now

1. U.S. considerations --

1. Strategic: Taiwan, located in the middle of the first island chain, has to stand firm for its own security as well as U.S. position in the Western Pacific.
2. Democracy: symbolic and emotional value.
3. Credibility to other U.S. allies in the region.

2. China’s considerations –

1. Reunification: As Taiwan people’s identity is shifting irrevocably and the DPP administration is leaning more overtly toward Independence, the island of Taiwan is apparently drifting away. Fear of “losing Taiwan” forever is growing stronger than ever before. Xi faces real risk of going down in history as the leader who will “lose Taiwan.”
2. Strategic: USN’s 288 ships enjoy open, long and wide access to two oceans. By comparison, the PLAN’s 355 ships are hemmed in by an island chain with only two narrow straits as outlets, Bashi and Miyako. And Taiwan is near both. As PLAN’s shipbuilding continues apace, Taiwan’s strategic value will only soar.
3. U.S.-Taiwan collaboration: Many doves inside China used to argue: “There is no hurry with reunification, because Taiwan is decaying politically and economically and China is growing fast. Any rush with reunification may damage ‘China’s rejuvenation,’ – hence not worth the risk. The best approach is to wait patiently for Taiwan to fall onto the lap of the motherland.” Not any longer. Doves are nowhere to be found now. More prevailing perception is: “If Taiwan’s and U.S. anti-China policies continue to press onward and their collaboration intensifies, patience on reunification will not pay off in the long run and ‘China’s rejuvenation’ itself will suffer first. So short-term pain related to reunification may be more tolerable than long-term pain with heightened uncertainty of ‘rejuvenation’.”

3. Taiwan, along with its semiconductor industry, becomes the bone of contention, coveted by both powers.

3. Taiwan: Most Uncomfortable and Unwilling Bone

1. Over the centuries, unlike Ukraine and any other countries in East Asia, Taiwan has never fought and suffered substantially from a major war. Hence its people are totally unprepared psychologically.
2. Domestically the Tsai Ing-wen administration continues to reaffirm the maintenance of status-quo, based on the reasoning that “China WILL NOT strike” and “the U.S. WILL come to our rescue.” Thus the threat perception among the people on Taiwan has always be very low, so low that for years no politician dared to talk about restoration of conscription or increase of defense budget, let alone preparation for warfighting regarding weaponry, training, ammunition, medical needs, etc. Any such preparation would trigger fear and breakdown of President Tsai Ing-wen’s promise of “maintenance of status quo.”
3. As a result, the “will to fight” among the Taiwan people is very low, despite some polls. While surveyed, some people tend to give politically or morally correct answer. Facts (from open sources) speak louder:

1. Young officers are severely lacking in ROC armed forces, especially the pilots at the captain/lieutenant colonel levels who make the backbone of our Air Force. Large number of them are quitting their service before their time is due, despite an offer of big pay raise, even at the expense of losing their pension.
2. Many Army companies are also short of qualified officers, resulting in poor training.
3. This problem is so dire that one Defense Minister openly urged university graduates to volunteer for military service, promising to offer them an officer’s rank “after 10-week training.” His call fell mostly on deaf years.
4. Number of applicants to armed forces academies continue to drop, especially for the Air Force and Army, despite lowering the admission standards. Admission scores for pilots are far below those of the ground crew.
5. Since 2016 all ten graduates of West Point, VMI, and other U.S. military academies chose to quit at the ranks of major and captain, among them two having served shorter than the mandated period of ten years.
6. Defense Ministry failed to recruit enough volunteers each year.
7. Large number of volunteers finishing their time chose to depart rather than extend their contracts. The number of sergeants outnumber those of officers and soldiers combined.

4. Hence, Taiwan is not Ukraine.

4. Toward a Less Contentious Role of Taiwan

1. A less contentious role of Taiwan will reduce tension and the potential for conflict between the two great powers. Semiconductor supply chain will be ensured. World economy will be spared a big shock. Taiwan who bears the brunt of any conflict, large or small, will be saved from a possible historic turn earlier than necessary. Other countries in the region will sigh with a collective relief.
2. My preferred approach toward this goal is cross-strait dialogue. It’s not easy, but doable. As anything in politics, “whereas there is a will, there is a way.” And it has been done before, without jeopardizing Taiwan’s security or dignity. After 2024 presidential election, the new president should kick a new start.
3. Another approach is U.S.-China dialogue, which is perhaps more difficult, both in terms of domestic politics and the range of issues involved. But it should not be excluded, because…