作者：Larry Diamond, Jim Ellis, and Orville Schell
來源：Foreign Affairs
日期：Jul 17, 2023

摘要：

台灣安全和半導體供應鏈安全的動態變化決定了當前的中美關係。美國對兩者都有關鍵的利益，但兩者之間偶爾存在矛盾。
 

半導體地緣政治

• 美國在半導體研究和設計方面仍處於全球領先地位，但台灣、韓國、日本和中國的製造能力已超過美國。
• 2020 年發生的大規模半導體供應鏈中斷事件導致各行各業癱瘓，而供應鏈可能被對手武器化的潛在威脅讓決策者們明白了供應鏈的脆弱性。
• 這也加劇了人們對台灣安全的擔憂，尤其是北京正在加大對台灣的軍事和地緣政治壓力。如果中國控制了台灣，美國及其盟國將失去對半導體供應鏈的控制。
• 台灣依靠半導體產業遏制中國的入侵，並防止世界其他國家拋棄台灣。
• 因此，美國有兩個相互交織的利益：保障半導體供應鏈和確保台灣的安全。美國必須追求能同時達成兩者目標的戰略。

美國能做甚麼？

• 確保在友好國家之中有立即可行的替代方案，可以滿足美國對各種規模半導體的需求。
• 優先考慮將半導體生產轉移到美國本土，但這需要很長的時間和很高的成本。另一種選擇是與可信賴的夥伴合作，確保供應鏈的安全，或協助美國建設製造設施。
• 提供必要的立法、基礎設施、服務和人才，吸引更多私人投資。
• 擴大與台灣在半導體技術研究方面的合作，吸引台灣人到美國發展。
• 提高台灣對中國大陸的軍事威懾能力。

注意事項

• 確保潛在競爭對手不會獲取美國的關鍵技術。美國外資投資委員會（CFIUS）在審查外來投資時應更加嚴格和透明。
• 注意中國傾銷低端晶片的可能性，這可能會影響半導體市場。

The dynamics of Taiwan's security and the security of the semiconductor supply chain define the current US-China relations. The US has a critical interest in both, but it occasionally contradicts with another.

Semiconductor Geopolitics

• The US is still the global leader in semiconductor research and design, but Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and China have overtaken its manufacturing capacity.
• The massive semiconductor supply chain disruption in 2020 that crippled various industries and the potential weaponization of the supply chain by an adversary made policymakers understand how vulnerable the supply chain is.
• It also contributes to the concerns about Taiwan's security, especially when Beijing is increasing military and geopolitical pressure on Taiwan. If China controls Taiwan, the US and its allies will lose control of the semiconductor supply chain.
• Taiwan relies on the semiconductor industry to deter Chinese invasion and prevent the rest of the world from abandoning it.
• Therefore, the US has two intertwined interests: securing the semiconductor supply chain and ensuring Taiwan's security. The US must pursue strategies that uphold the goals of the other.

What can the US do?

• Ensure there are immediate alternatives in friendly countries to satisfy the US's demand for semiconductors of all sizes.
• Prioritize reshoring semiconductor production to its soil, but it will take a long time and high cost. Another alternative is to engage trusted partners to ensure the security of the supply chain or assist the US in building fabrication facilities.
• Attract more private investments on top of subsidies by providing necessary legislation, infrastructure, services, and talents.
• Expand cooperation with Taiwan in semiconductor technology research and attract Taiwanese to pursue a career in the US.
• Improve Taiwan's military deterrence capacity against China.

Caveats

• Ensure potential rivals do not acquire critical US technologies. The CFIUS should be more vigorous and transparent in reviewing inbound investments.
• Be aware of the Chinese dumping of lower-end chips that can affect the semiconductor market.